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INTRODUCTION
According to a famous legend, six blind persons once set out to
discern the shape of an elephant. Unable to follow all of its con-
tours, each observed only a single part of the majestic mammal. As
a result, the men and women arrived at six different perceptions of
the object of their study. Failing to synthesize their isolated obser-
vations, the six could not appreciate the true nature of what they
attempted to describe. The moral of the story is that discrete analy-
sis of the parts, accurate though it may be, often distorts one's per-
ception of the whole. The current state of intellectual property
theory is a case in point.
In recent years, the importance of intellectual property law-
both as an academic discipline and as a real world phenomenon-
Integrated Theory of btellectual Property
has risen meteorically.' Oddly, however, there exists a striking mis-
fit between the academic theory of intellectual property and its use
in the real world. Economists and legal scholars tend to treat each
of the constituent fields of intellectual property as discrete and in-
sular.2 Worse yet, the same insularity has pervaded the United
States Supreme Court's intellectual property jurisprudence. Most
recently, in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays, Justice Ken-
nedy opined that "[trademark law] does not exist to reward manu-
facturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is
the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. '"3 In this
view, patents and copyrights offer limited protection to novel proc-
esses or intellectual products, while trademark law protects good-
will.4 Those who actually use intellectual property protection, how-
ever, appreciate that its various modalities can be combined to
yield important synergies: Patents can help create goodwill, and
trademarks can be used to appropriate the gains from innovation.5
'See Drug Development: Intellectual Property and Patent Protection are New
Concerns, Biotech Wk., May 16, 2001, at 10, 10 (reporting that a survey of 272 senior
executives in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical product industries re-
vealed that "the development and protection of intellectual property is seen as the
most critical area, as nearly all the senior executives surveyed identified an urgent
need to address issues such as protecting proprietary research, valuing intellectual
property, and extending patent protection"); Joff Wild, A Yawning Gap That Too
Many Companies Fail to Recognise: Accounting for IP, Fin. Times, June 21,2001, at
3, 3 ("There is a growing belief that, with the increasing influence of the knowledge
economy, directors cannot deliver best value to shareholders unless they know the
true value of a company's intellectual property.").
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Fron-
tiers, 76 Ind. LJ. 803, 804 (2001) (contending that "intellectual property comprehends
at least five or six separate areas" and arguing that "[t]he mere fact that intellectual
property law subsumes these six separate fields does not guarantee that any proposi-
tion that holds good for one of these areas will necessarily carry over to a second");
Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cy-
berspace, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 107, 141 (2001) (suggesting that "[clourts have generally
been careful to articulate distinctions between patents and copyrights").
3 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001). We would like to note that our criticism is addressed to the
Court's disregard of the important commonalities between patent and trademark pro-
tection. We agree with the Court's ruling in this case. See discussion infra Section
V.A.
4 See Doris Estelle Long, First, "Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property Lawyers!":
Musings on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J. Marshall I.
Rev. 851, 889 (2001) (suggesting that "[t]he TrafFi: case raises serious concerns about
the future of trademark intersections with both patents and copyrights").
5 See Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Law: A Practitioner's Guide § 1:1.5[D], at 1-7
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The conventional view has acknowledged the possibility of em-
ploying alternative modes of intellectual property to protect a
given business asset-most notably, the availability of patent or
copyright protection for software.6 But it has largely ignored-and
occasionally been hostile to-the possibility of combining different
modes of intellectual property to reinforce one another. Much like
the blind persons in the elephant tale, existing analysis has failed to
discern the important synergies that flow from combining different
modes of protection. In this Article, we will seek to redress this
omission by exploring the consequences of combining various
modes of intellectual property protection. We will focus on the
possibility of combining patent and trademark protection by lever-
aging patents through trademarks, but we will also discuss the syn-
ergies between trademarks and both trade secrets and copyrights.
The possibility of leveraging patents through trademarks calls
into question the dominant paradigm in intellectual property. Al-
though patent, copyright, and trademark are the three principal
subfields in the area of intellectual property, the first two are tradi-
tionally deemed to rest on a different economic foundation from
the latter. From an economic standpoint, patents and copyrights
embody a tradeoff between ex ante and ex post perspectives. Ex
ante, society seeks to encourage innovation and expressive creativ-
ity by awarding market exclusivity over the products that result
from these activities." The cost of copying innovative products and
(3d ed. 2001) ("Trademarks, patents, and copyrights... [a]ll... may apply to a single
product."). Empirically oriented economists have recognized that patents are not the
only or even the most important sources of appropriability. See discussion infra Sec-
tion III.A.
6 See, e.g., Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 174-75 (5th ed. 2001).
7 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (explaining that "[s]triking the correct balance
between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law"); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L,
Rev. 989, 990 (1997) (noting that excessive intellectual property protection deters
subsequent innovation as it "freeze[s] development at the first generation of prod-
ucts").
$See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (explaining that "'[ihe copyright law, like the patent
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.'... The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
1458 [Vol. 88:1455
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original expressive works is invariably lower than the cost of pro-
ducing them initially,9 and in a competitive market the price will be
driven down to the marginal cost of copying.
Thus, on the one hand, absent exclusivity, inventors and authors
will be unable to appropriate the full social value of their products,
and too little innovation is likely to result.'0 On the other hand,
once an invention or a copyrighted work has been produced, soci-
ety wishes to cabin the distortions caused by exclusivity by limiting
the duration of patents and copyrights." Trademark protection, by
contrast, is not usually thought to embody a comparable tradeoff.
Rather, its purpose is to permit firms to establish or maintain
goodwill and to preserve their reputation among consumers. 3
Thus, trademark protection is, in principle, infinite in duration.'4
the conviction that... [it] is the best way to advance public welfare through the tal-
ents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."') (citation omitted).
'See Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy 3 (1999). Professors Shapiro and Varian observe that "production
of an information good involves highfixed costs but low marginal costs." For example,
"100-million dollar movies can be copied on videotape for a few cents." Id.
10 Or, as Judge Richard Posner succinctly explained the rationale underlying the
patent system, "the manufacturer... will not sow if he won't be able to reap." Rich-
ard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.3, at 43 (5th ed. 1998).
" The limited duration is not dictated by economics alone, of course; it is mandated
to some degree by the Intellectual Property Clause in the Constitution. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Even before the ratification of the Constitution and the adop-
tion of the U.S. patent and copyright laws, English jurists struggled to reconcile ex
ante incentives and ex post distortions. See Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140
n.(b) (1801) (Lord Kenyon, CJ.) ("'The rule of decision in this case is a matter of
great consequence to the country. In deciding it we must take care to guard against
two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits,
and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be de-
prived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded."') (quoting Sayre v.
Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785) (Lord Mansfield, CJ.)).
12 A trademark does not "depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of
the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought."
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). "Rather, trademark protection is awarded
merely to those vho were the first to use a distinctive mark in commerce." Robert P.
Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 525 (1997).
'See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & Econ. 265,270 (1987) ("The value of a trademark is the saving
in [consumer] search costs made possible by the information or reputation that the
trademark conveys or embodies about the brand (or the firm that produces the
brand."). Some, however, have criticized recent developments in trademark law as
going substantially beyond this purpose, allowing trademarks to become an anti-
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1455
Despite the different economic and legal theories underlying
them, however, we contend that both patents and trademarks allow
firms to appropriate the benefits of investment in Research and
Development ("R&D") and product quality.15 While the effect of
patents on investment in R&D is well recognized, 6 the comple-
mentary effect of trademarks on innovation has received virtually
no attention." Combining patent and trademark protection can
create two important types of synergies for a firm. First, the exis-
tence of a patent can reduce the cost of establishing a strong
trademark because the exclusivity granted by the patent may lower
the advertising expenditures necessary to create a dominant brand.18
competitive force. See, for example, Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999), which draws heavily on in-
sights developed in Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165 (1948).
"See Kane, supra note 5, § 1:1.5[D], at 1-7 ("Trademark law, unlike patent and
copyright law, confers a perpetual right. So long as the trademark continues to iden-
tify a single source, the user of a confusingly similar mark is liable for trademark in-
fringement.").
See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23(1) J. Le-
gal Stud. 247, 247-49 (1994). Professor Dam notes that the patent system solves the
"appropriability problem"-the problem that innovation would be inhibited if a firm
could not recover the costs of invention-by creating property rights in inventions.
The solution, however, also entails three secondary economic problems: monopoly
leading to a deadweight loss, rent-seeking, and inhibition of future innovation.6 For example, the leading textbook on industrial organization describes the incen-
tive effects of patents as follows:
The funds supporting invention and the commercial development of inventions
are front-end "sunk" investments; once they have been spent, they are an irre-
trievable bygone. To warrant making such investments, an individual inventor
or corporation must expect that once commercialization occurs, product prices
can be held above postinvention production and marketing costs long enough
so that the discounted present value of the profits (or more accurately, quasi
rents) will exceed the value of the front-end investment. In other words, the in-
vestor must expect some degree of protection from competition, or some mo-
nopoly power. The patent holder's right to exclude imitating users is intended
to create or strengthen that expectation.
F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
622 (3d ed. 1990).
" Commentators, however, have recognized that trademarks provide an incentive to
invest in existing goods. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Un-
fair Competition § 2:4, at 2-4 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that trademarks "create an incen-
tive to keep up a good reputation for a predictable quality of goods" and thereby "fix
responsibility" for low quality products).
The relationship between advertising and monopoly power is notoriously com-
plex, but any given amount of advertising by Acme Widgets is likely to be more suc-
1460
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Establishing brand loyalty may be easier under conditions of exclu-
sivity than when one has to fend off numerous rivals.'9 Xerox, for
example, succeeded in establishing such strong branding for its
patented photocopy machines that its mark has become virtually
synonymous with the product, and almost fell into the public do-
main for genericism after consumers began to use "xerox" as a
verb and a noun.2°
Conversely, brand recognition can be used to extend the protec-
tion afforded by patents well beyond the legal protection period.
For example, consumers remained loyal to Bayer Aspirin for dec-
ades after it went off patent, in spite of the existence of identical
generic drugs that sold for much less and despite the fact that the
"Aspirin" mark had been pronounced generic.2' It is this type of
synergy that will be the main focus of this Article. The holistic view
of intellectual property that we will develop in this Article enables
us to offer four novel insights about the theory and practical use of
intellectual property law.
In Part I, we will observe that the existence of synergies between
patents and trademarks challenges the conventional wisdom that
the economic effect of a patent grant is limited to the statutory pro-
tection term of twenty years. Combining patent and trademark
cessful in attracting customers if it has 100% of the market than if it shares the market
with other firms whose advertising competes with or offsets its own. In this sense,
competitive advertising has aspects of the prisoner's dilemma-each brand's adver-
tisements may largely serve to offset those of its rivals, and all established firms might
be better off if they could agree (without violating antitrust laws) to advertise less, or
not at all. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 1691 n.21; see also Douglas G. Baird et al.,
Game Theory and the Law (1994) (explaining the application of the prisoner's di-
lemma, equilibrium solutions, and game theory generally to traditional legal prob-
lems).
There are non-strategic considerations that may cut in the other direction, however,
and lead a monopolistic industry to advertise more (per dollar of sales) than a com-
petitive one. See Robert Dorfman & P.O. Steiner, Optimal Advertising and Optimal
Quality, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 826 (1954).
'9 See discussion infra Section III.B.
'See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines:
Cases and Materials on the Law of Intellectual Property 230 (rev. 3d ed. 1993) (relat-
ing the story of the "Xerox" trademark's close encounter with the public domain).I See Bayer Co. v. United Drug, 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (finding Aspirin a ge-
neric mark with respect to consumer, though not producer, sales); see also Charles C.
Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Aspirin Wars: Money, Medicine, and 100 Years of
Rampant Competition (1991) (recounting the intellectual property history of Aspi-
rin).
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protection may afford patentees a considerably longer period of
protection than is commonly assumed. An important implication of
this observation is that if the present statutory patent duration was
chosen to reflect the optimal tradeoff between rewarding innova-
tion and limiting monopoly power, then patentees who extend
their patent with a successful trademark are actually receiving
more monopoly power than the statute contemplates. We use the
term "trademark leverage" to describe patentees' ability to charge
supracompetitive prices even after the patent has lapsed and the
invention is protected only by a trademark.
In Part II, we will submit that, counterintuitively, the enhanced
protection afforded by such leveraged patents is actually welfare-
enhancing. The reason is that leveraging patents through trade-
marks generates incentives for patentees to price more competi-
tively over the patent life, without adding monopolistic distortions
in the trademark period. In short, leverage allows for a more fa-
vorable tradeoff between incentives to innovate and monopolistic
pricing than is traditionally envisioned.
Economic analysis of patent law-traditionally conducted on a
stand-alone basis-assumes that the patentee will maximize her
rents during the term of protection by charging the monopoly price
for the invention.2 Specifically, the patentee will restrict the quan-
tity of output below the competitive level, to the point at which its
marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost. This generates a so-
cial deadweight loss,23 because some consumers who would be will-
ing to pay more for the product than its marginal cost are unable to
purchase it from the monopolistic patentee; the gains from trade
that would be available in a competitive market are lost as a result
of the patentee's monopoly.24
The possibility of leveraging patents through trademarks trans-
forms the analysis. When patents can be extended through creation
of brand loyalty, the patentee will strive to maximize her rents not
" Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 128 (3d ed. 2000).
Deadweight loss arises from the fact that, in maximizing profits, a monopolist will
cut back on the quantity it produces, thereby refusing to sell to some consumers who
would be willing to pay more than the cost of producing the good in question. The dif-
ference between consumer valuation and producer cost, for these foregone sales, is
the economist's measure of the deadweight loss of monopoly. See George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Price 197 (3d ed. 1966).
24Id.
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over the twenty-year patent term, but rather over the combined
period of patent and trademark protection. Hence, a forward-
looking patentee will consider not only current output, but also the
effects of current output on future demand. Specifically, a profit-
maximizing patentee will charge less than the monopoly price dur-
ing the patent period if doing so enhances its branding and leads to
higher profits over the long run. Thus, we posit that even patentees
who wield monopoly power by dint of the legal exclusivity con-
ferred upon them may prefer not to extract the full monopolistic
rent afforded to them by the patent grant.
In Part III, we will demonstrate that this prediction is not merely
of theoretical significance: It finds support in commercial reality.
Evidence from various industries shows that, in some circumstances,
patentees behave in accordance with our analysis, raising output
above the monopolistic level (and lowering prices) in order to in-
crease their future profits through trademark protection.
Critically, the welfare gain from lower prices is not offset by a
corresponding loss attributable to a longer duration of protection.
Once the patent expires, the former patentee's loyal customers pay
a higher-than-market price for the off-patent product, but the mar-
ginal (new) customers buy from the new entrants, who charge the
competitive price and eliminate any deadweight loss. In other
words, the ability to combine patents and trademarks makes it pos-
sible for the patentee to shift profits from the "distortionary" pat-
ent period to the competitive trademark period, where the pat-
entee can charge higher-than-competitive prices without reducing
the overall quantity supplied.2 As a result of this shift, the dead-
weight loss in the patent period is lowered, without any accompa-
'Put another way, the patentee's loyal customers are subject to a kind of price dis-
crimination, and, thus, are worse off than they would be if they could buy at the com-
petitive price. The higher prices they pay, however, are a pure transfer to the pat-
entee, with no efficiency consequences. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 203-04
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing price discrimination in the licensing of patents); Louis Kap-
low, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813, 1873-
81 (1984) (discussing price discrimination and patent law); cf. Michael J. Meurer,
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 55 (2001) (discussing
price discrimination and copyright law). Readers of this Article may be particularly
interested in Stanley Liebowitz's findings on the role of price discrimination in mar-
kets for academic journals. See SJ. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and
Price Discrimination, in 8 Research in Law and Economics: The Economics of Pat-
ents and Copyrights 181 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986).
2002] 1463
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nying cost in the subsequent trademark period. Patent leveraging
thus increases welfare.
In Part IV, we will demonstrate that the same welfare-enhancing
effect that arises from combining patent and trademark protection
also occurs when trade secrets and trademarks are combined. Al-
though trade secrecy does not have inherent time limits, it lapses if
the protected information falls into the hands of competitors, ei-
ther through a breach of secrecy or through reverse-engineering.
For the purpose of our analysis, this risk serves the same function
as the time limitation on patents: It mitigates the incentive of the
trade secret holder to price monopolistically. Realizing that the
trade secret may expire at any given time, a rational trade secret
owner will prefer not to price monopolistically during the trade se-
crecy period if doing so will sufficiently increase the long term
value of her brand. In this case, too, the net welfare effect of com-
bining the two modes of protection may be positive. 6
We will examine in Part V how legal policy should take account
of the possibility that patent and trademark protection can be
combined. We argue that the Supreme Court's failure to appreci-
ate the positive synergies between patents and trademarks led it
badly astray in the landmark case of Singer Manufacturing Co. v.
June Manufacturing Co.27 In expressing its strong disapproval of
Singer's strategy of leveraging its patents through a trademark, the
Court concluded that the "coincidence between the expiration of
the patents and the appearance of the trademark.., tends to create
a strong implication that the company... [acted] in order thereby to
retain.., the real fruits of the monopoly when that monopoly had
passed away."' According to our analysis, the Court erred in con-
demning a practice that increases welfare. Thus, Singer and its
progeny should be overturned.
Moreover, our analysis counterintuitively suggests that efficiency-
minded policymakers would be justified in either shortening or
lengthening the patent term, or indeed leaving it at its present
length. Any of these is a defensible alternative because leverage
26Although there may be some instances in which copyright and trademark protcc-
tion can be combined, leverage does not seem to apply to copyright protection gener-
ally. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
2 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
2Id. at 181.
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creates both greater incentives to innovate and a lower static
deadweight loss, thereby generating a more favorable tradeoff be-
tween these two goals, which policymakers may wish to exploit in a
variety of ways.
Leverage pushes out the possibility frontier, allowing policymak-
ers a range of desirable options. In particular, we propose a self-
selection mechanism that allows society to offer patentees the same
level of profits as the current system at a lower cost in deadweight
loss.29 Alternatively, policymakers might opt for a higher level of
profits for patentees, with no increase in deadweight loss. We offer
an illustrative example of how such policies might be implemented.
Finally, in Part VI, we will take on a series of possible objections
to our argument, including the presence of advertising, the exten-
sion of the model to a more realistic multi-period world with dis-
counting, and the empirical finding that-at least for some prod-
ucts-prices rise, rather than fall, on expiration of a patent. None
of these, we show, requires substantial modification of our conclu-
sions.
I. THE INSULAR VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. The Theory
Intellectual property law rests on an elegant model that divides
the field into three principal subfields-copyright, patent, and trade-
mark-each protecting a distinct subject matter and promoting a
unique social goal. Copyright law protects expressive works; patent
law protects functional products, processes, and designs; and trade-
mark law protects information about the source of goods and prod-
ucts. The separation among these three subfields is reinforced by
the different prerequisites to securing each mode of protection.
Copyright protection requires works to be original," minimally
creative,3 1 and fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 2 Patent
See discussion infra Section V.C.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
.
1See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991) (explaining that
"[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independ-
ently created by the author.., and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity").
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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protection extends to inventions that are new,3 useful,' 4 and
nonobvious3 to a person skilled in the relevant art 6 Trademark
protection is sparked by the use of a mark in trade.37 Furthermore,
the three subfields differ in the duration of the protection they af-
ford. Copyright protection lasts for the life of the author plus sev-
enty years.3 Patent protection extends twenty years from the date
of filing for utility patents,39 and fourteen years from the date of is-
suance for design patents.4° Trademark protection continues poten-
tially forever, as long the mark is used in trade.
The economic rationale for copyrights and patents is also as-
sumed to be different from the rationale for trademarks. Copy-
rights and patents are predicated on the need to provide an eco-
nomic incentive for the creation of public goods such as inventions
and expressive works.42 Since expressive works and inventions con-
3335 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
-' Id.
-'-Id. § 103.
Id.; see Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 844 (1990) ("During prosecution of a patent, a
Patent Office examiner reviews an application to determine what is patentable. To be
patentable an invention must meet all the statutory requirements for patentability:
novelty, utility and non-obviousness."). In addition, "[w]hile decisions regarding what
[claims] to allow are constrained by a number of legal principles, and by the invention
itself, in many cases the Patent Office has considerable room for discretion." Id. at
840.37 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 45 (3d
ed. 2001) ("Simply by using a mark on or in connection with goods, or by displaying
the mark in the sale or advertising of services, you can automatically acquire trade-
mark rights in the geographic area of use.").
m 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
3935 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
40 Id. § 173.
" See, e.g., Ginsburg et al., supra note 37, at 46 (noting that "[t]raclemark rights con-
tinue indefinitely")..
42 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors 609 (1962); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Ration-
ale of Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 421, 425 (1966) ("The general
welfare will ... be enhanced by enacting copyright legislation which encourages the
creation and publication of manuscripts that otherwise would not have come into ex-
istence."); Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 326; see also Richard P. Adelstein &
Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright
and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 209, 218 (1985)
(discussing the similarities between intellectual goods and traditional public goods).
But see Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
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tain information-the quintessential public good-absent legal
protection, competitors would copy such works without incurring
the initial costs of producing them. Unauthorized reproduction
would drive down the market price to the cost of copying, original
authors and inventors would not be able to recover their expendi-
tures on authorship and R&D, and, as a result, too few inventions
and expressive works would be created.
To make matters worse, many of the inventions that would not
be produced absent intellectual property protection are likely to be
of great social value. Socially important inventions often implicate
not only large expenditures, but also a high level of risk. Inventors,
who work under conditions of extreme uncertainty, do not know,
ex ante, whether the R&D process will yield the anticipated result.
Nor do they know how the invention will fare commercially." Sub-
sequent copiers, however, confront no similar risks since they have
the privilege of being able to reproduce, risk-free, only those in-
ventions with proven commercial success.
Copyright law and patent law eliminate the inherent advantage
of copiers, and thereby restore the incentive to innovate. By creat-
ing and enforcing exclusive rights in intellectual goods, copyrights
and patents not only stifle unauthorized copying, but also enable
authors and inventors to charge for the use of their works. In addi-
Approach, 12 Hamline L. Rev. 261, 273-87 (1989) (arguing that intellectual works do
not share the distinguishing attributes of public goods).
Public goods are defined by two distinctive characteristics: non-rivalry in consump-
tion and non-excludability of benefits. See, e.g., Richard Comes & Todd Sandier, The
Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 6-7 (1986). A good is non-
rival in consumption when consumption by one person does not diminish the con-
sumption opportunities available to others. See id. at 6.
A good displays non-excludable benefits when individuals who have not paid for it
cannot be prevented from availing themselves of its benefits. See id. It should be
noted that the impossibility of exclusion is hardly ever absolute. When exclusion by
contract is considered, very few goods, if any, display non-excludable benefits in the
strict sense of the term. Thus, it is more accurate to describe goods as displaying non-
excludable benefits when it is prohibitively costly to bar non-payers from enjoying the
good. See Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 631, 632 (1993). The non-excludability property of public goods
implies that they will be under-produced by the market.
See Lemley, supra note 7, at 994 (noting that "[i]nvention and creation require the
investment of resources-the time of an author or inventor, and often expenditures
on facilities, prototypes, supplies, and the like[,]" and therefore, absent intellectual




tion, copyright law and patent law provide the necessary founda-
tion for market exchange between providers and consumers of in-
tellectual goods. The development of a market, in turn, produces
two desirable effects: It increases the return on authorship and in-
novation, and it lets the forces of supply and demand set the price
of intellectual goods.
In contrast, the economic justification for trademark protection
is rather different. Unlike patent and copyright protection, which
seek to spur the creation of inventions and expressive works,
trademark protection purports to enhance competition among pro-
viders of goods and services." By identifying the source of goods
and services, trademarks promote competition in two related ways.
First, trademarks enable businesses to convey information to con-
sumers about the quality of products and services, reducing con-
sumers' search costs.4 This informational function of trademarks is
especially valuable in the context of "experience goods"-products
whose attributes consumers cannot discern before purchasing
them46 --where consumers rely on prior experience in deciding
among competing brands.
Second, trademarks allow consumers to associate product and
service attributes with certain firms and base their consumption
decisions on this association. For this reason, on the supply side,
trademark protection spurs firms to maintain and improve the
quality of their products and services.4 The availability of trade-
See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946); H.R. Rep. No. 79-219, at 2 (1945) ("Trade-
marks defeat monopoly by stimulating competition."). For arguments that excessive
trademark protection can have anticompetitive effects, see Brown, supra note 13, and
Lemley, supra note 13.45 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law 601, 602 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting that trademarks
"facilitate and enhance consumer decisions"); William P. Kratzke, Normative Eco-
nomic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 199, 214-17 (1991); see
also George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ, 213, 224 (1961)
(discussing reputation as a method of saving on search costs).
Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729, 730 (1974) [here-
inafter Nelson, Advertising as Information]. A "search good," in contrast, is one
whose important attributes may be ascertained before purchase or use. Id. The terms
"experience good" and "search good" were originally coined by Professor Nelson in
1970. See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311,
319 (1970).
" See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 269-70. Landes and Posner note that
trademarks have a self-enforcing quality because "they denote consistent quality, and
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mark protection protects firms against free-riding by competitors,
enabling them to reap the fruits of their investment in superior
products and services. Furthermore, trademark protection provides
firms with an incentive to establish brand recognition and loyalty
by "educating" consumers about the virtues of their products.
Thus, trademarks constitute an important channel of communica-
tion between firms and consumers, with the attendant twin effects
of motivating the former to improve the quality of their products
and services, and enabling the latter to differentiate among various
products on the market.
Law and Economics scholars have largely ignored the existence
of synergies among the various types of intellectual property pro-
tection. For example, the leading Law and Economics text sug-
gests that the economic justification for patents is that they are
"temporary monopol[ies] that reward invention." By contrast,
trademarks are designed to "lower consumer search costs and cre-
ate an incentive for producers to supply goods of high quality.""O
B. The Case Law
The insular view of intellectual property has also been a persis-
tent theme in the Supreme Court's intellectual property jurispru-
dence. The tone was set in three classic decisions. In Baker v. Sel-
den, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the
respondent, Selden, could obtain copyright protection for a system
of bookkeeping by means of a book in which the system was ex-
plained.51 Pointing to the different subject matters of copyright and
patent protection, and the different requirements for each, the
a firm has an incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain consistent
quality." Id. at 270.
'There has, however, been some appreciation of these synergies in the mainstream
economics literature. See discussion infra Part III.
"9 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 22, at 128. The authors also note that "the price [of a
patented good] falls and the quantity increases as soon as the patent expires." Id. (em-
phasis added).
Id. at 137. Similarly, a recent survey article notes that, "[u]nlike patents and copy-
rights... trademark protection did not originate as an incentive for innovation or
creativity... [Instead, t]he primary function of trademarks is to provide rules of or-
derly marketing ... ." Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the
Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 3,20-21 (1991).
;" 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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Court refused to allow copyright protection for patentable subject
matters, repeatedly emphasizing the need to keep the province of
copyright separate from that of patents. 2 It concluded that to do
otherwise would amount to "a fraud upon the public."53
Fifteen years later, in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manu-
facturing Co., the Supreme Court elucidated the relationship be-
tween patents and trademarks.5 4 The issue confronting the Court in
Singer was whether a mark that had been used in connection with a
patented subject matter becomes generic at the expiration of the
patent.55 While the Court stopped short of ruling that any mark as-
sociated with a patented product falls into the public domain when
the patent expires, it established that the existence of a previous
patent is a factor to be weighed in determining the validity of a
mark. Specifically, the Court ruled that the "Singer" mark fell into
the public domain at the expiration of the patents on the sewing
machines.56
Critical to this finding was the Court's strong disapproval of
Singer's attempt to leverage its patents through trademarks by es-
tablishing the name "Singer" and the shape of its machines as
trademarks in the years preceding the expiration of its patents. The
proximity in time between the appearance of the trademark on the
machines and the impending expiration of its patents implied to
the Court that Singer had sought to extend the benefits of its mo-
nopoly beyond the patent protection period.57 Rephrased in eco-
nomic terms, the Court acted to bar Singer from enjoying monopo-
listic rents-what the Court called "the real fruits of the
monopoly"'--in the post-patent period.
Nearly four decades later, the Supreme Court further solidified
the conceptual separation between patents and trademarks in Kel-
52Id. at 104-05.
S3Id. at 102.
163 U.S. 169 (1895).
5 Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 186. The operative result of this finding was to allow the defendant to affix
the "Singer" mark to its products, so long as it clearly indicated that it, not Singer, was
the manufacturer of the machine. For a case suggesting that the "Singer" mark was
subsequently resurrected, see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Redlich, 109 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal.
1952).
' Singer, 163 U.S. at 181.
'Id.
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logg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.9 In Kellogg, the Court was given
an opportunity to revisit its ruling in Singer when Kellogg brought
a trademark infringement suit, post-patent expiration, against Na-
bisco for using the mark "Shredded Wheat." Construing Singer
broadly, the Court enunciated that upon the expiration of a patent
"there passe[s] to the public.., not only the right to make the arti-
cle as it was made during the patent period, but also the right to
apply thereto the name by which it had become known." Effec-
tively, the Court's decision may be read to have established a per
se rule that a mark designating a patented product becomes ge-
neric at the end of the patent term.6'
These cases prompted some leading intellectual property schol-
ars to suggest that "the federal regimes are preemptive of each
other-that the same innovation cannot be protected by both pat-
ent and copyright law, or by both patent and trademark law." 6"
Subsequent decisions by lower courts, however, repudiated the
preemption theory as between copyright and patent. In Application
of Yardley, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") refused to issue a design patent on an ornamental wrist-
watch on the ground that the Spiro Agnew caricature featured on
the watch face had been registered independently in the United
States Copyright Office.Y In reversing the PTO, the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained that Congress in-
tended there to be a degree of subject matter overlap between the
protection afforded by design patents and that granted by copy-
- 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
60 Id. at 118.
6 This extreme view, articulated in Goldstein, supra note 20, at 232-33, would sug-
gest that when the patent on Prozac expired in August of 2001, new producers could
market their chemically identical product (fluoxetine) as "Prozac." In other words, Eli
Lilly's exclusive right to use the brand name Prozac would vanish with the expiration
of its patent. The fact that no generic entrants ever market their product under the
original trade name suggests that Professor Goldstein may not be correct (or that
producers are all too risk-averse to find out). It is possible, however, that the Kellog
Court's broad rule stems from the fact that the mark "Shredded Wheat" was descrip-
tive, if not generic, from the beginning.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Intellectual Property:
Trademark, Copyright and Patent Law 848 (1996); see also Michael J. Kline, Requir-
ing an Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs (Part
I), 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 280 (1985) (arguing that an election abandoning
cogyright protection should be made upon the issuance of a patent).
493 F.2d 1389,1391-92 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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right.6' Accordingly, the court ruled that the "'election of protec-
tion"' doctrine, on which the PTO relied in denying the patent, is
"in direct conflict with the clear intent of Congress."
Over two decades later, in 1995, the Copyright Office finally fol-
lowed the PTO and announced that it was abandoning the "elec-
tion of protection" doctrine, under which it had refused for many
years to register copyright claims over pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural designs for which design patents had been issued.6 These pol-
icy changes have opened the way for concurrent copyright and pat-
ent protection for the same subject matter, and have proven to be
of great significance in the context of computer software.6'
Importantly, the Supreme Court's rulings in Singer and Kellogg,
as to the illegitimacy of leveraging patents through trademarks,
have not been revisited. Thus, while businesses can choose be-
tween trademark and patent protection, and while they may be
able to secure concurrent trademark and patent protection for
functional designs, they likely cannot combine trademark and pat-
ent protection sequentially to leverage their patents. Attempts to
leverage patents through trademarks will be frowned upon by the
courts.6
In sum, the Supreme Court's intellectual property jurisprudence
suffers from three principal defects. First, the insistence on viewing
copyright, patent, and trademarks as protecting distinct social
goals-a position shared by many Law and Economics scholars-is
in many cases simply wrong. As we will show, trademark protec-
tion also spurs innovation and can complement the incentive pro-
vided by patents to expend resources on R&D.
Second, the Court's emphasis on protection, rather than on
value, has driven a wedge between the legal system's approach to
Id. at 1394 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)).
6 Id.
'Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (2002); see Douglas R.
Wolf, The Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 439, 463-64 (1991) (discussing the Copyright Office's acceptance of
the "election of protection" doctrine as of 1991).
'7 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Software and Internet Law 38-45 (2000) (explaining
that various substantive areas of law may be employed to protect computer software,
including trade secret law, copyright law, patent law, trademark law, sui generis laws,
and contract law).
"See discussion infra Section V.A.
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intellectual property and that of the business community. Speaking
to managers of intellectual property, Professors Carl Shapiro and
Hal Varian advise that, "your goal should be to choose the terms
and conditions that maximize the value of your intellectual prop-
erty, not the terms and conditions that maximize the protection."
Instead, courts have wrongly adopted rules that are hostile to value
maximization.
Third, and most importantly, the judicial treatment of intellec-
tual property is not helpful for policy analysis. The Supreme
Court's formalistic approach has prevented it from evaluating the
welfare implications of combining different modes of intellectual
property protection. We will demonstrate that combining different
modes of protection may give rise to important synergies that have
so far gone unrecognized. These synergies, contrary to the prevail-
ing view, enhance social welfare.
H. A SIMPLE MODEL OF PATENT/TRADEMARK LEVERAGE
The combination of patent and trademark protection generates
two complementary advantages for the intellectual property holder.
First, the limited monopoly afforded by patent protection may fa-
cilitate the establishment of brand loyalty during the patent life.
Thus, patent protection enhances the value of the company's mark.
Second, brand loyalty enables patentees to preserve some of their
market share after the patent protection expires. This implies that
trademark protection can supplement patent protection. The net
effect of combining patents and trademarks is stronger protection
than that afforded by either alone. Surprisingly, however, we dem-
onstrate that despite this stronger protection for patentees, lever-
aged patents are actually welfare-enhancing, since they mitigate
patentees' disposition to price monopolistically.
To see why trademark protection lessens the incentive to price
monopolistically, imagine a world without any trademarks at all. In
such a world, when the patent on an invention expires, anyone can
produce and market it under the patentee's mark. To take a con-
crete hypothetical example, when Prozac went off patent, any
pharmaceutical company would have been able to produce the
drug and market it under Eli Lilly's "Prozac" mark; no generics
6 Shapiro & Varian, supra note 9, at 5.
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would exist. The absence of trademark protection would affect
patentees in two ways. First, patentees would take full advantage
of the patent grant by pricing monopolistically while they were
able to do so. Second, patentees would have less incentive to invest
in the quality of their products and services. Without brands, brand
loyalty is meaningless.
The introduction of trademark protection extending beyond the
patent life completely transforms the analysis. By enabling compa-
nies to create brand loyalty, trademark protection not only makes
it rational for them to invest in the quality of their products, but
also puts pressure on them to increase the number of sales during
the patent term to broaden their loyal customer base for the post-
patent period. Thus, trademark protection may reduce the social
deadweight loss generated by patent protection. In. this Part, we
present a formal model that shows how leveraging patents through
trademarks may improve social welfare. We then support our theo-
retical results with empirical evidence from various sources. Fi-
nally, we discuss how various factors such as advertising and a
more sophisticated dynamic model affect our findings.
A. The Model
To illustrate the effect of trademarks on patents, we construct a
stylized two-period model.70 In the first period, the firm can use
patent protection to select the feasible price-quantity combination
that maximizes its profits. In the second period, the patent protec-
tion lapses, and the firm must rely exclusively on brand loyalty cre-
ated earlier, plus trademark protection, to secure supracompetitive
profit.7' We show that the existence of trademark protection does
"For the sake of simplicity, we condense the twenty-year statutory period of patent
protection into a single period and ignore issues of discounting, which are peripheral
to our basic insight. In the Appendix, we offer a dynamic multi-period model in which
we consider each year of patent protection separately, and allow the monopolist to
choose optimal quantity over time, allowing for discounting. Our dynamic model
demonstrates essentially the same result as above, although the assumption of long-
lived consumers is in tension with the existence of brand loyalty. See infra Appendix.7
'Although the patentee is assumed to be forward-looking, consumers are not,
Hence, we do not model consumers as choosing between buying today versus buying
next period. Such consumer "myopia" is a standard assumption in these contexts-see
Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. Econ. 375 (1987);
Jean Gabszewicz et al., Sequential Entry with Brand Loyalty Caused by Consumer
1474 [Vol. 88:1455
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not lead the patentee to exploit her full monopoly power, as she
would in a world where patents were the only available form of
protection.72
Assume that the demand for the patented invention is described
by a linear (inverse) demand curve,
(1) P = a - bQ
where P is the prevailing price, Q is the quantity chosen by the
patentee, a is the maximum price the patentee can charge (at Q=0),
and -b is the slope of the demand curve. Assume further that the
patentee produces at constant marginal cost, c.7 Since the patentee
is a monopolist while the patent is in effect, in a single period
model with patent protection she would maximize her profits, as
represented by
(2) 11 = (a - bQ)xQ.
To accomplish this, she will choose the quantity, Q, that solves
(3) c311/8Q = a - 2bQ = 0.
This implies that Q*, the profit maximizing quantity for the pat-
entee, is al2b. Intuitively, the monopolist sets marginal revenue
equal to marginal cost (here, 0) in order to maximize profits. Note,
Learning-by-Using, 40 J. Indus. Econ. 397 (1992)-and seems intuitively plausible.
'We stress that we are far from the first to point out that a monopolist who consid-
ers the long run will have reasons for selling more than (and pricing below) the single-
period monopoly optimum. For example, Professor Darius Gaskins showed how a
forward-looking monopolist would lower prices over time in order to deter entry.
Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of En-
try, 3 J. Econ. Theory 306 (1971). Professor Klemperer's model of switching costs
yields the same insight-oligopolistic firms may price at less than the static oligopoly
optimum in order to attract loyal users. See Klemperer, supra note 71, at 375-79.
Other reasons for pricing below the static monopoly optimum include network exter-
nalities and "learning-by-doing" (dynamic scale economies). See Gabszewicz et al.,
supra note 71.
Our story is related to the "Coase Conjecture" about the inability of a monopolist
producing a durable good to extract monopoly profit over time. See IRH. Coase, Du-
rability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & Econ. 143 (1972). Professor Coase's insight was that
the monopolist's potential future output may compete with her own present output,
so that consumers might rationally wait until next year to buy if the price this year is
too high. While there are some parallels, the large and complex literature spawned by
Coase's insight does not bear directly on our model.
" Without loss of generality, we assume c is equal to zero.
2002] 1475
1476 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1455
however, that Q* is only half of the socially optimal output, repre-
sented by a/b.74
Assume, now, that instead of a single period of patent protec-
tion, patentees can also take advantage of trademark protection at
the expiration of the patent. Demand is the same as in equation (1)
in both periods. We now consider how this changes the patentee's
behavior during the lifetime of the patent. As we show, the exact
effect of trademark protection depends on how the firm's pre-
expiration sales influence its profitability in the second period once
the patent has lapsed.
To start with the simplest case, suppose the patentee cannot take
advantage of trademark protection after the patent expires. This
might occur if Singer and Kellog are read to ban trademark protec-
tion for previously patented products, or if the characteristics of
the product make development of brand loyalty impossible.75 In
this situation, once the product goes off patent, anyone can pro-
duce it, and the price will fall to the competitive level. Since the
original product is indistinguishable from the version produced by
the entrants, the law of one price requires that the previously pat-
ented and new versions must sell at the same price. As long as en-
try is possible, price will be driven down to marginal cost, with zero
profit. 6
If the patentee expects in Period 1 that the market will be com-
petitive in Period 2, she will maximize profits in Period 1 by charg-
ing the monopoly price. Since nothing she does in Period 1 affects
her profits in Period 2, she faces the monopolist's one-period
maximization problem and behaves accordingly. 7 This is the stan-
'
4In a competitive market, price equals marginal cost. With marginal cost equal to
zero and a linear demand curve, this requires 0 = a - bQ, which implies Q = alb.
's We found several instances in which more than one entity has the same name or
produces the same product. The best example is the trade name "Bayer Aspirin."
When Bayer lost its U.S. plant to an American firm during World War I, it also lost
the Bayer name and the company's trademark, the Bayer Cross. As a result, both
companies sold Bayer Aspirin. That is, "two different, competing enterprises used an
identical name to sell an identical product," and the "two Bayer aspirins fought each
other for more than seventy years." Mann & Plummer, supra note 21, at 15.
716 This assumes that there are no fixed costs, which we have already factored out of
the problem. We are also assuming that product quality is exogenously fixed, so that
in the absence of trademark protection, firms would not run-down the quality of their
products.
"Formally, II = PQ, + PQ,, where P, is the competitive price. In this case, the sec-
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dard account of how patentees behave.78 As we will show, however,
the conventional view is merely a special case of a more general
model, which allows for the patentee to retain some market power
in Period 2 by establishing brand loyalty among her Period-1 cus-
tomers. 9
In a two-period world without brand loyalty, the patentee will
act as a monopolist while she can do so (in Period 1). Once we con-
sider brand loyalty made possible by trademark protection, how-
ever, it becomes clear that the patentee may prefer not to charge
the full monopoly price. We suggest that a patentee who can culti-
vate brand loyalty while the patent is in effect will prefer to forego
some revenues in the patent period in order to obtain higher prof-
its after the patent lapses. We use the term "trademark leverage"
to describe patentees' ability to charge supracompetitive prices
even after the patent has lapsed and the invention is protected only
by a trademark
Inherent in the definition of brand loyalty is the notion of prior
use. Indeed, it would be odd for consumers to be loyal to a product
they have never tried. Hence, the number of sales made while the
patent is in effect will affect the patentee's loyal customer base in
Period 2. Critically, this means that increasing sales in Period 1 en-
ables patentees to charge supracompetitive prices to more custom-
ers in Period 2 than would otherwise be possible.
Formally, we model this effect as a switching cost, so that any
consumer who tries the product in Period 1 incurs a cost, S > 0, to
purchase a different brand in Period 2.8' The introduction of
ond-period profit is zero, so the patentee does not care what quantity it sells in Period
2, only in Period 1.
"See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 22, at 128.
The existence of trademark makes it possible for consumers to identify the output
of each firm, and this might be thought to make each firm less than perfectly competi-
tive with its rivals. Should the behavior in Period 2 then be modeled as monopolistic
competition? Jean Tirole suggests not, arguing that "[t]he point of monopolistic com-
petition [theory] is... not to study strategic aspects between products (such as prod-
uct positioning and price competition), but rather to abstract from them to simplify
the analysis and study other issues, such as the number of products offered by a mar-
ket economy." Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 288 (1988).
8 We stress that the existence of "leverage" depends on the characteristics of the
product being sold. For a discussion of factors that enhance or limit the development
of brand loyalty, see infra text accompanying notes 85-99.
This phenomenon can occur for a number of reasons, many of which can be cap-
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switching costs drives a wedge between the price the patentee can
charge her loyal customers and the price new entrants can charge
this group. In other words, consumers who buy from the patentee
in the first period will be willing to pay a premium of S for the pre-
viously patented product, even when identical products are avail-
able at a lower cost. Therefore, when the patent expires and entry
drives the price down to the competitive level, the price that pat-
entees can charge loyal customers in Period 2, P2, is P,+S.
The patentee would never find it in her interest to charge less
than P, (which would earn negative profit), and if she were to
charge more than P, + S, she would lose all her customers. Hence,
the patentee will always choose the price in Period 2, P2, to be P, +
s.
82
tured under the rubric of "switching costs"-defined as a cost that a consumer must
pay to change brands. For example, consumers may learn how to use a product by
consuming it. For example, a regular airline traveler who has learned how to find her
way around United's terminal may then prefer to fly United rather than American,
even if American offered an identical flight at a lower cost. Sheer force of habit, or
uncertainty about product quality, may also lead some consumers to continue buying
brands they have purchased in the past, even when lower-priced substitutes exist.
There has been a substantial body of work in this vein, largely focusing on the con-
sequences of switching costs for equilibrium in game-theoretic models of oligopolistic
markets. The pioneering work that offers a typology of switching costs and a sophisti-
cated analysis of their effects is by Paul Klemperer. See Klemperer, supra note 71.
The work most similar in spirit to ours is that of Professors Gabszewicz, Pepall, and
Thisse. Gabszewicz et al., supra note 71. They model a two-period game, with a mo-
nopolistic incumbent producing a new product in the first period and then facing an
oligopolistic rival in the second. Consumers learn about the product by consuming it,
and this creates brand loyalty in Period 2 for those who tried the incumbent's product
in Period 1. Their main result is similar to ours-the incumbent will expand its cus-
tomer base in Period 1 by producing more and charging less than the one-period mo-
nopoly optimum. This sacrifice of profits in Period 1 is a form of investment in brand-
loyalty; its return comes because lower prices and more customers today allow the
firm to keep prices above the competitive level for loyal customers tomorrow. Al-
though it does not discuss either trademarks or patents, the paper is important be-
cause it demonstrates that our basic insight does not depend on our admittedly ex-
treme assumption that the market is perfectly competitive in the second period (after
the patent lapses).
' The patentee no longer faces a downward-sloping demand curve once the patent
expires. Her loyal customers will purchase exactly the same quantity they bought last
period at any price below P, + S, and will purchase nothing at all at any price above
this level. Hence, there is no price-quantity tradeoff until the patentee's price exceeds
the competitive price by more than the switching cost, S.
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At price Pc + S, the patentee will sell the same quantity in the
second period as she did in the first. Hence, the patentee's two-
period optimization problem becomes:
(4) Max II = PQ, + (P, + S)Qj = (a - bQ,)Q, + (P, + S)Q,
Q
where P, is the price charged in the patent period, P, is the price
charged by the competitive entrants, and S is the switching cost for
the patentee's loyal customers. To find the profit-maximizing out-
put over the two periods, Q", the patentee solves
(5) all/aQ, = a - 2bQ, + S = 0,
which implies
(6) Q = (a + S)12b = Q" + SI2b.
The first thing to note is that the patentee's optimal quantity
choice with trademark leverage is the same as its choice without
leverage, plus the positive term SI2b. Hence, the optimum quantity
under a leveraged patent is always larger than without leverage
(Q**= a'+ S2b > Q).
The reason for this result is simple. For a leveraged patentee, an
increase in first period quantity has two effects. On the one hand,
expanding output above the single-period monopoly level reduces
current profits. On the other hand, more output today means more
loyal customers and higher profits next period, an effect that is
made possible by trademark leverage. A firm that takes leverage
into account will optimally produce more than one that does not
because the leveraged firm's marginal revenue is always larger at
any given quantity.
The welfare consequences of patent leverage follow from its ef-
fect on Period-1 output. The more the patentee produces in Period
1, the lower the price is, and the smaller the monopolistic distortion
or deadweight loss. While the patentee charges its loyal customers
a higher-than-competitive price in Period 2, this has no effect on
the quantity demanded because the marginal (inexperienced) pur-
chasers can buy at the competitive price in this period. No effi-
ciency consequences result from those who do buy from the former
patentee in Period 2 paying more than the competitive price, since
the marginal buyers pay the appropriate price and everyone who
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values the product more than its cost is able to buy it. Of course,
the higher price paid by loyal buyers generates higher profits for
the former patentee, but this has purely distributional effects.
Higher consumer prices translate directly into higher profits for the
patentee, with no quantity reduction and hence no deadweight loss.
Finally, note that the leverage effect is directly proportional to
the size of the consumer switching cost, and negatively related to
the slope or elasticity of the demand curve. The first relationship
should be obvious. Higher switching costs make consumers less
likely to switch, while making the capturing of consumers more
valuable. Hence, as S increases, each dollar of lower profit from
output expansion in Period 1 is traded off against higher profits in
Period 2, which encourages additional production in the first pe-
riod.
As the slope parameter, -b, gets larger and the demand curve
gets steeper, the leverage effect becomes weaker. The reason is the
converse of the one given above. The more price-sensitive con-
sumer demand is in Period 1, the greater the fall in Period 1 price
for any given quantity increase. Hence, inelastic demand imposes
on the patentee a larger burden in foregone profits in Period 1 for
each additional Period-2 customer it seeks to retain.
Table 1 provides a numerical illustration of our results using the
parameters listed below.
Table 1: Profits and Welfare Over Two Periods,
With and Without Trademark Leverage"
Patent Patent + Absolute Percent
Only Trademark Change Change
Patentee's Profits 2500.0 3025.0 525.0 21,0
Consumer Surplus 6250.0 5962.5 -287.5 -4.6
Total Welfare 8750.0 8987.5 237.5 2.7
% of Maximum Welfare 87.5 89.9
The Table demonstrates that the addition of even a relatively
modest switching cost (equal to one-fifth of the monopoly price)
83 Calculated based on parameter values: a = 100, b = 1, S = 10, c =. 0.
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can have significant effects: The patentee's profits are 21% higher,
and in spite of this, total static welfare is nearly 3% higher with
leverage than without it."
It is important to stress that the dynamic-or long run-welfare
gain from leveraged patents is potentially substantially larger than
the static 2.7% listed in Table 1. The reason is that the Table counts
as the welfare gain from leverage only the reduction in static
deadweight loss (monopolistic quantity distortion) while the patent
is in effect. In addition to reducing deadweight loss, however, the
ability to leverage patent protection through trademarks and brand
loyalty also raises the patentee's profits-in our example, by a
hefty 21%. This in turn creates a larger incentive for R&D expen-
ditures on the part of future patentees, since any innovation is
worth 20% more with leverage than without. Hence, we expect
that leverage should give rise to additional innovations that will
yield further welfare gains over the long run. The 2.7% welfare
gain should thus be seen as a lower bound.
B. Refinements and Limitations
The foregoing analysis has implicitly taken the possibility of lev-
erage as a given. We have assumed that customers always exhibit
brand loyalty, which patentees can cultivate by lowering prices, re-
gardless of the characteristics of the product or industry. In reality,
however, the possibility and magnitude of trademark leverage de-
pend on various factors, such as product characteristics, demand-
side characteristics, and the existence of intra-brand spillovers.
1. Product Characteristics
The economics literature draws a distinction between search and
experience characteristics of products.Y Search characteristics are
The explanation for this result is that leverage creates three effects:
1. The patentee increases Period-1 output, which lowers her profits and raises
consumer welfare. Consumers gain more than the patentee loses, however, ow-
ing to the reduction in deadweight loss;
2. Loyal customers pay more in Period 2 than they otherwise would; and
3. This raises monopoly profit (by more than it fell in Period 1), but does not
create any deadweight loss because it represents a pure transfer from consum-
ers to the (former) patentee.
See Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note 46, at 730.
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those "that the consumer can determine by inspection prior to pur-
chase of the brand." Experience characteristics are those that can
only be ascertained by actual consumption of the product.7 Al-
though it is convenient to speak of search or experience goods, in
reality virtually all goods exhibit a mixture of search and experi-
ence characteristics. Consider clothes, typically considered a search
good, for example. Even though consumers can observe the design
and color of clothing without purchasing it, there are still important
attributes that may only be learned through long-term use, includ-
ing durability, comfort, and compatibility with other clothes. Once
such factors are taken into account, it becomes clear that there are
very few, if any, pure search goods.
Brand loyalty is easier to cultivate for heterogeneous products
with important experience characteristics. Heterogeneous products
allow consumers to have preferences across different brands along
one or more dimensions. In the context of cars, for example, these
might include status, safety, gas mileage, and service. The more
heterogeneous the product, the greater the potential for brand loy-
alty. In addition, if such characteristics must be experienced to be
appreciated, consumers will be less willing to switch brands once
they have found one they like.8 Even for goods whose characteristics
can be evaluated without actually purchasing them, higher search
costs should also promote brand loyalty. Thus, more complex
products with important experience characteristics should be more
amenable to the exercise of leverage.
2. Demand-Side Characteristics
In addition to product attributes, brand loyalty may also be af-
fected by the attributes of the consumers who purchase the prod-




'Certain drugs are an apparent exception: Some consumers will pay substantially
more for branded Advil or Tylenol, even though generic ibuprofen or acetaminophen
are, by law, chemically identical. The premium commanded by Bayer Aspirin long
after the identical product was available from competitors at dramatically lower prices
is another example of the same phenomenon. Presumably, producers have succeeded
in creating artificial distinctions in the mind of consumers even though the underlying
physical products themselves are not appreciably different.
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loyal to products such as pharmaceuticals out of fear that alternate
drugs will not work as well. 9 This aversion to trying new drugs is
reasonable as long as elderly consumers are satisfied with their cur-
rent medicines, since experimentation with new ones subjects them
to some risk of harm. Moreover, switching to new products, even
superior ones, is less valuable for elderly consumers because the
cost of searching will be amortized over a smaller number of re-
maining purchases. Conversely, teenagers' consumption patterns are
strongly affected by social pressures to conform with what peers
are buying, and thus they exhibit more brand loyalty.®
Another source of brand loyalty is the degree to which consum-
ers fail to take their own future consumption into account when
making present consumption choices. Searching for an alternative
product is more attractive if a superior product, once discovered,
will be purchased repeatedly, simply because the gains per pur-
chase are multiplied by a larger number of purchases. If consumers
ignore the fact that they will purchase the product repeatedly, they
will thus be more likely to stick with their current choice rather
than search for an alternative product.
Brand loyalty is also plausibly influenced by consumers' tastes
for variety. Consumers who prefer variety will be predisposed to
switch among brands in order to enrich their consumption experi-
ence. By contrast, if consumer preferences are subject to habit forma-
tion, so that repeated consumption alters the consumer's underlying
utility function in favor of the product consumed, brand loyalty will
be correspondingly enhanced.
Many prescription drugs are covered by health insurance, and
are often provided by HMOs. These institutions are unlikely to de-
velop the same kind of loyalty to a branded drug that individuals
have, and instead are likely to make decisions about which drugs to
cover based largely on price. When a generic version of Prozac be-
See James L. Dettore et al., Branding Lessons from Consumer Marketing, Phar-
maceutical Executive, May 1, 2001, at 48 ("Loyalty is an extremely important part of
pharmaceutical branding. Consumers who have used a medication for a long time of-
ten balk when their insurance companies no longer cover that brand. They go to great
lengths to get their favorite products, such as calling or writing letters to insurance
companies and doctors. Brand loyalty benefits are long term. Consumers fill certain
prescriptions continually for years-sometimes for their entire lives.").
'See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 Geo. L.J. 1977, 1986-88 (2001)
(discussing, generally, the consumption of "emotion-relevant" goods).
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comes available, for example, one would expect many HMOs not
to cover Prozac itself, and pay only for its generic substitute. This
may have the effect of reducing brand loyalty in the market for
prescription drugs, although our story would presumably still apply
in other markets (such as over-the-counter drugs). Moreover,
HMOs may respond both to marketing efforts by producers and to
consumer demand for branded products; their decisions may be
governed by some degree of brand loyalty after all.
3. Rate of Technological Change
Another factor that affects the degree of trademark leverage is
the rate of technological innovation. For trademark leverage to be
valuable for patentees, the patented product must remain of com-
mercial value at the end of the patent life. The rate of innovation
therefore sets a ceiling on the value of patent protection, since sub-
sequent technology may render a prior innovation obsolete even
before its patent expires. For example, the advent of DVD tech-
nology might make a patent on a VCR valueless before significant
brand loyalty has a chance to develop.9
In an empirical study, Mark Schankerman found that the rate at
which patents depreciate varies by industry.92 For example, phar-
maceutical and chemical patents were estimated to depreciate at a
rate of 5% per year, whereas mechanical and electronic patents
depreciated more rapidly, at a rate of 10-15% per year.93 This sug-
gests that the value of trademark leverage will be higher for certain
patentees than for others. The slower the rate of patent deprecia-
tion, the easier it is to establish brand loyalty.
4. Spillovers and Brand Equity
Under most branding regimes,94 brand loyalty may spill over
across products because customers may generalize from one prod-
91 This statement should be qualified given the analysis of spillovers across products.
See infra Section II.B.4.
9 See Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Tech-
nology Field, 29 RAND J. Econ. 77 (1998).
9Id. at 92.
9 There are many branding structure alternatives. A leading marketing textbook
lists four:
1. Individual brand names: General Mills, for example, produces each product
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uct to another made by the same firm. For example, if a consumer
has a positive experience with her first type of Kellogg cereal or
Ford car, she may be more likely to try a second product made by
the same manufacturer. If both of a firm's brands are protected by
patents, then intra-brand spillovers should make little difference to
pricing and quantity decisions. But suppose that product A is pat-
ented, while product B is protected only by a trademark. In this
case, consumers who purchase product A may be induced to buy
product B as well. This, in turn, increases the patentee's incentive
to lower the price of product A. A cut in the price of product A will
not only increase demand for that product, but will indirectly raise
demand for product B as well, as consumers transfer their favor-
able experiences with A to other goods made by the same firm."
Therefore, spillovers across products of the same firm or brand
are likely to further the importance of trademark leverage, just as
spillovers of brand loyalty across pre- and post-expiration demand
for the same product do. One can thus think of cross-product spill-
overs as the cross-sectional analog to time-series brand loyalty, with
essentially the same consequences-firms will be led to lower
prices on monopolistic (patented) goods in order to increase de-
mand for competitive (unpatented) goods in the same family of
brands.
(Bisquick and Betty Crocker) under a separate label.
2. Blanket family name for all products: a strategy followed by, for example,
General Electric.
3. Separate family names for all products: a strategy followed by, for example,
Sears (Kenmore appliances, Craftsman tools, etc.).
4. Company trade name plus individual product name: examples include Ford
(Ford Taurus, Ford Escort), or Kellogg (Kellogg's Rice Krispies, Kellogg's
Corn Flakes).
See Philip Kotler, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation, and
Control 450 (9th ed. 1997).
9 Products A and B are thus technically economic complements, since dQAIdP, < 0.
The rationale here has nothing to do with the standard story arising from utility
maximization subject to a budget constraint, however. Instead, operating in the back-
ground, there is uncertainty about product quality, in the face of which consumers
rely on the firm's name to draw inferences about the quality of prospective purchases.
Of course, the decision about which brand naming strategy to adopt is not exoge-
nous. A company that makes fertilizer and pancake mix will be more likely to follow
the first strategy rather than second or fourth, precisely to avoid "contaminating" one
of its brand names with associations from the other.
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While a complete theory of brand loyalty is well beyond the
scope of this paper, Table 2 provides a summary of some of the
relevant factors that determine the extent to which consumers will
persistently buy the same brand, even when similar alternatives sell
for less.
Table 2: Factors Promoting or Retarding Brand Loyalty
Market or Product Effect on Brand Loyalty
Characteristic
Homogeneous or Little rationale for brand loyalty if all products are
Simple Product similar-for example, nails, gasoline, paper.
Products whose key attributes are well-described
"Search" Attributes prior to purchase are easy to compare; consumers
Important should be willing to switch to another brand if specifica-
tions (or price) are superior to usual choice.'
Consumers have more or better information about
Information Costs products they have already purchased." More informa-
tion about rival products (for example, via Consumer
Reports) yields less loyalty.
Habit-Forming Products that change tastes of consumers generate
Product higher brand loyalty.
Consumers do not find it worthwhile to sample
Low Price Product widely as long as current brand seems satisfactory, be-
Relative to Search Cost cause little price or utility gain-for example, tooth-
paste.
Product Appeals to Particular types of products-for example, life in-
Especially Habit-Prone surance (for the risk-averse) and arthritis medicine (for
Customers the elderly), increase brand loyalty.
If one-time switching cost amortized over large
Frequent Purchase + number of future purchases, consumers should be will-
Consumer Myopia ing to switch brands even if price difference is small
relative to the switching cost.9
' Nelson, Advertising as Information, supra note 46, at 730.
9 Nickolay Moshkin & Ron Shachar, Switching Costs or Search Costs? 3 (Jan. 13,
2000) (unpublished working paper, Tel Aviv University) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
9 See infra Appendix.
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IH. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SYNERGIES
While the relationship among patents, trademark protection,
and brand loyalty is-we believe-an original contribution of this
Article, a number of empirical studies support or are consistent
with our model. We briefly discuss the prior academic literature,
and then document several case studies in which firms have devel-
oped synergies between patents and trademarks in much the way
our theory predicts.
A. Previous Empirical Work
There is a substantial empirical literature documenting the exis-
tence of brand loyalty.'O For example, a recent study by Andrea
Coscelli finds loyalty is prevalent among consumers, even for drug
brands that, by law, are chemically identical, and even after con-
trolling for the prescribing behavior of physicians.0 ' Professors
Greg Allenby and Peter Lenk also find persistence in buying pat-
terns over time, using supermarket scanner data on a variety of con-
sumer purchases. °2 Although their focus is on sellers' price and cost
margins rather than on consumer behavior per se, Professors Bar-
sky, Bergen, Dutta, and Levy uncover large price premia for name
brands over essentially identical house brands across a wide range
of consumer products-a finding consistent with the importance of
brand loyalty."'e
00 See, e.g., Kotler, supra note 94, at 444 (describing the importance of brand loyalty
for marketing management).
'0, Andrea Coscelli, The Importance of Doctors' and Patients' Preferences in the
Prescription Decision, 48 J. Indus. Econ. 349,367-68 (2000).
" Greg M. Allenby & Peter J. Lenk, Reassessing Brand Loyalty, Price Sensitivity,
and Merchandising Effects on Consumer Brand Choice, 13 J. Bus. & Econ. Stat. 281
(1995).
'03 See Robert Barsky et al., What Can the Price Gap Between Branded and Private
Label Products Tell Us About Markups? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8426,2001). Since the authors do not track individual consumers' purchases
over time, their work does not actually demonstrate brand loyalty. But without such
loyalty, it would hard to understand how, for example, Advil or Motrin could sell for
substantially more than the house brand of ibuprofen, which is chemically identical.
This study is notable for its scrupulous care in eliminating product types for which the
house brand might be of lower physical quality than the name brand, such as toilet
tissue and soft drinks. Id. at 12-16. Professors Raj Sethuraman and Catherine Cole
use survey data to demonstrate that many consumers have strong preferences for na-
tional over house brands, even when they acknowledge that the higher prices charged
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Beyond the existence of brand loyalty, there are scattered refer-
ences in the empirical literature to synergies between loyalty and
patents. For instance, writing in 1980, Professor F.M. Scherer, au-
thor of the leading textbook in Industrial Organization, noted:
Competition, product differentiation, and natural lags interact to
form... incentives for investment in research and innovation.
Frequently, a company's image is enhanced by being first on the
market with a new product, and through this product differentia-
tion advantage it may be able to maintain a favorable price dif-
ferential or retain a sufficiently large share of the market to earn
supranormal profits for some time .... "
Similar conclusions were reached by Professor Levin and others
in a study of the factors that allow firms to appropriate the benefits
of innovations."5 Using survey data from interviews with high-level
R&D executives, these authors conclude that in many industries,
patents are relatively unimportant in protecting firms' R&D ex-
penditures, in part because "investments to establish the brand
name of a patented product may outlive the patent itself."' '
After surveying the empirical literature on the causes and con-
sequences of being the first firm to enter a market, Professors Rob-
inson, Kalyanaram, and Urban conclude that "[f]irst-mover advan-
tages.., are important in... [several] industries. The sources of
these first-mover advantages are varied, but customer familiarity
and brand loyalty are important. Overall, a market pioneer's en-
by the former do not reflect quality differences. See Raj Sethuraman & Catherine
Cole, Why do Consumers Pay More for National Brands than for Store Brands? 35
(Mktg. Science Inst., Report 97-126,1997).
° F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 445 (2d
ed. 1980). Only one study was offered as evidence for this proposition, id. at 445 n.25,
however. See Ronald Bond & David Lean, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Sales, Promotion,
and Product Differentiation in Two Prescription Drug Markets 11-79 (Staff Report,
Feb. 1977). Moreover, neither study draws the connection between trademarks and
brand loyalty.
05 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 3 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 783 (1987).
'06Id. at 784. While downplaying the importance of patents generally, the study by
Levin and his colleagues concludes that patents are crucial to protecting intellectual
property in some industries (for example, the drug and chemical industries). And
where trade secrets, rather than patents, are the means of protection, our analysis re-
mains valid. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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during trademark protection is more important than patent protec-
tion. ' 0 7
Moreover, they note:
[F]irst-mover advantages developed in the marketplace are typi-
cally more general and long-lasting than product patent protec-
tion .... [In addition,] the empirical results indicate that trade-
mark protection of the pioneer's brand name is often important.
When consumers rely on the known and familiar pioneering
name, gaining trial can be especially difficult for later entrants.
Strong brand names are often maintained for literally genera-
tions. For example, 19 of the top 25 consumer brand names in
1923 were still market leaders in 198321s
In sum, the academic literature offers support for our view that
brand loyalty is an important phenomenon and that it can be used
in combination with patent protection to generate supracompeti-
tive rates of return to firms with new products.
B. Case Studies
In this Section, we offer several examples of how patented prod-
ucts are marketed with an eye towards the expiration of the patent.
In each instance, the patentees have adopted a strategy of building
market share and brand loyalty for the period after the patent ex-
pires. Although the examples do not offer full sets of time-series
data on pricing and output decisions, patentees do seem to be cut-
ting prices and increasing output, and for precisely the reasons
predicted by our model.
1. Roundup
One of the clearest examples of using a brand name to leverage
one's patent protection is Roundup (chemical name, glyphosate),
an herbicide patented by Monsanto in 1980."9 "Roundup is the
best-selling agricultural chemical product ever, with $2.8 billion of
107 William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Mar-
kets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 Rev. Indus. Org. 1, 6 (1994).
" Id. at 17-18.
"
9 See Robert Steyer, Monsanto Reports Success for New Roundup, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Dec. 22,1996, at 1E.
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sales [in 2000]; it outsells other chemicals five to one."11 Despite
the monopoly conferred by its patent, Monsanto began cutting
prices on Roundup in the mid-1980s, in order to develop an addi-
tional customer base.' The company followed-
[a] brilliant strategy of dropping its price years ahead of patent
expiration .... "It was a classic pricing strategy,"... "a textbook
case. Every 1 percent price drop led to a 2.5 or 3 percent increase
in volume."... Even more, few competitors are willing to pro-
duce a generic version of Roundup... because Monsanto has
protected its market dominance by cutting the price while finding
new uses. This built loyalty while reducing the profit that poten-
tial competitors could reap by trying to lure away customers."'




Patented by Searle in 1972, the artificial sweetener aspartame
was not introduced on the market until ten years later under the
brand name NutraSweet. 114 From the beginning, the company ap-
parently focused on building brand loyalty for the period after the
"0 David Barboza, The Power of Roundup, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,2001, at C1.
" Steyer, supra note 109, at 1E.
112 Barboza, supra note 110, at C1, C6.
113 The retail price of Roundup fell from "about $44 a gallon in 1997 to $34 in 1999
to about $28 [in 2000]." Id. at C6.
As both of the previous articles make clear, the company also adopted numerous
other tactics to forestall competition besides cutting prices to build brand loyalty. For
example, Monsanto made technical modifications to the chemical in response to con-
sumer demand, and in an attempt to receive a new patent. The company also built
substantial production capacity in advance of demand in order to forestall entry by
competitors. And it agreed to license its product to competitors once the patent ex-
pired, making it unattractive for competitors to produce glyphosate themselves. Fi-
nally, Monsanto created crops that were genetically-engineered to be tolerant to
Roundup, so that the herbicide could be sprayed directly on the fields, killing weeds
but not the crops. Consumers who used Monsanto's genetically-modified ("Roundup-
Ready") seeds had to sign an agreement promising to use only Monsanto's herbicides
rather than generic glyphosate. See Steyer, supra note 109, at 1E.
.. Nancy Millman, King of the Tabletop: NutraSweet Pours on Loyalty Effort, Chi.
Trib., Sept. 17, 1995, at 2.
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patent expired. Initially, NutraSweet was available only to produc-
ers, not to the public at all, and sold for $90 per pound. '
In 1984, as Coca-Cola Co. and PepsiCo were reformulating their
newly burgeoning diet colas from saccharin blends to aspartame
sweetener, the NutraSweet company used its growing consumer
loyalty base to negotiate more exposure for its brand. Nu-
traSweet cut the sweetener's price to companies that featured the
new "100 percent NutraSweet" trademark swirl on their pack-
ages, and bestowed even bigger breaks for ad campaigns men-
tioning the reformulation.1
6
As the date of the patent's expiration neared, NutraSweet "started
dropping its prices .... In 1989, prices were cut by 3 percent, and
another 6 percent was lopped off in 1990 .... In 1991,... the com-
pany cut prices by 10 percent, and it did so again in 1992 .... The
next year prices dropped by another 25 percent .... ,17
3. Tagamet
In 1993, SmithKline Beecham announced a direct-to-the-customer
rebate of $10 per month on the ulcer medication Tagamet, for a $20
per month savings over archrival Zantac." This was apparently the
first time that price cuts or rebates to consumers had ever been
used to bolster sales of a prescription drug. 9 Analysts linked the
price drop to the fact that Tagamet was going off-patent in May of
1994, and the desire to build brand loyalty before the advent of ge-
neric competition.20
4. Zovirax
An antiviral cream made for cold sores, Zovirax was initially
available only by prescription. In 1992, its manufacturer, Burroughs-
Wellcome, attempted to get approval for over-the-counter sales (at




.. Milt Freudenheim, A Drug Promotion Based on Price Breaks the Prescription
Tradition, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,1993, at Al.




1995.121 "Switching to selling over the counter is one of the strate-
gies Wellcome is using to protect its revenue from Zovirax. It
hopes to be able to build brand-loyalty among consumers, so ena-
bling it to maintain sales when its patent runs out and competitors
come in to the market."'
5. Bayer Aspirin
According to Mann and Plummer's careful history of Aspirin,
the originator of the drug-Germany's Bayer Co.-explicitly took
steps to leverage its patent protection through trademark after the
patent expired.'3
To counter the loss of its [American] patent, the firm turned to
its trademark. Bayer would try to make consumers so thoroughly
identify headache and fever relief with Bayer Aspirin that its ri-
vals would have no chance .... [Bayer decided] to boost the U.S.
production of Aspirin in tablet form. Each tablet was stamped
with the Bayer Cross, [the company's trademark,] and the tablets
were put in Bayer packages, which for the first time let consum-
ers see the name of the company that cured their headaches.'24
Again, we see a familiar story of trademark leverage-an attempt
to extend patent protection by means of trademark and brand loy-
alty, and an expansion of output while the product is still under
patent in order to increase the number of loyal customers.
What these cases show is that, especially near the end of a pat-
ent's life (but sometimes much earlier) some firms do implement a
.See Heather Connon, Pharmaceutical and Medical Sales: Companies Keen to
Switch, The Independent (London), July 22,1992, at 14.
122 Id.
Mann & Plummer, supra note 21, at 37.
12 Id. The reaction of the American Medical Association to this effort was strongly
negative. An editorial in the Association's Journal echoed the insular view of intellec-
tual property often expressed today, noting that-
[flor seventeen years .... it has been impossible in this country for anybody ex-
cept the Bayer Company to manufacture or sell acetylsalicylic acid .... Need-
less to say, the American people have been made to pay exorbitantly for the
monopoly our patent office granted this firm .... Not content with the iron-
bound monopoly which it had been granted through our patent laws, the com-
pany attempted further to clinch its exclusive rights by giving the preparation a
fancy name, "aspirin," and getting a trademark on this name.
Id. at 38 (quoting JAMA, Jan. 20,1917, at 201-02.).
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strategy precisely like the one predicted in our model. In an effort
to survive after the expiration of the patent makes generic compe-
tition inevitable, firms increase output and cut prices. (Of course,
many other tactics are often pursued simultaneously as well.) This
is described as an effort to build brand loyalty-an attempt to
make the product distinctively attractive to consumers who will
soon be faced with a cheaper generic alternative. What is not
stressed in the reports on which these case studies are based is that
the effort to develop and maintain brand loyalty also serves to in-
crease overall efficiency.
IV. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS TO TRADE SECRECY AND
COPYRIGHT
In this Part, we examine the applicability of our findings to trade
secrecy and copyright protection. We posit that despite the funda-
mental differences between trade secrecy and patents, the combi-
nation of trade secrecy and trademark protection generates the
same efficiency effects we identified with respect to patents in
cases in which trade secrecy creates market monopolies. In fact,
the uncertain, or probabilistic, nature of trade secrecy-the fact
that trade secrets may become public at any time-implies that the
positive impact of trademarks in this context may be greater than
in the context of patents.
We also predict that combining copyright with trademark yields
much smaller efficiency effects relative to those we identified for
patents and trade secrets. This difference is predominantly due to
the fact that copyright protection is long enough to make the pos-
sibility of additional trademark protection in the post-copyright pe-
riod of very limited value for copyright owners. Thus, we expect
the availability of trademark protection to have an inconsequential
effect on the pricing decisions of copyright owners.
A. Trade Secrecy
Originating in the middle of the nineteenth century,'2s trade se-
cret law protects any information that derives independent eco-
w See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 241,247 (1998) (discussing the origin of trade secret law).
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nomic value from being disclosed when that information is subject
to reasonable secrecy precautions."6 In principle, trade secret law
applies to unpatentable as well as patentable information.'27 Con-
sequently, trade secrecy serves both as a complement to and substi-
tute for patent protection. As a complement to patent law, trade
secret law protects information that fails to meet the patentability
standard for lack of novelty, usefulness, or nonobviousness118 As a
substitute for patent protection, trade secrecy presents businesses
with a choice between patent and trade secret protection. While
firms can elect either option, they cannot employ both modes to
protect the same information. The subject matter overlap is evi-
dent in trade secret litigation. As one commentator reported, most
trade secret cases "involve technological subject matter-such as
the formula for Coca-Cola, a process for making methanol, or the
dimensions of a robot-operated machine. ' 29
Notwithstanding the extensive subject matter overlap, patent
and trade secret protection differ in three important respects. First,
patent protection is conditioned on full disclosure; trade secrecy
rests on non-disclosure. In the context of patent, it is the disclosure
of valuable information that justifies the social cost associated with
the legal monopoly.13 In contrast, secrecy is the touchstone of trade
secret law.
12 Section 1(4) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, adopted with some minor changes
by over forty-three states, defines "trade secret" as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily as-
certainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985).
"See 2 Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 8.02[5] (2002); see also
Bone, supra note 125, at 248 ("[A]Imost anything can qualify as a trade secret, pro-
vided it has the potential to generate commercial value.").
8 Id. ("Unlike patent law, which only protects inventions that are 'nonobvious,'
trade secret law protects all inventions that confer a competitive advantage, even ones
that are not especially new.").129 Id.
"This foundational exchange-the grant of a temporary monopoly in exchange for
adequate disclosure-is a long-standing principal of patent law. See, e.g., Grant v.
Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (noting that an enabling disclosure "is nec-
essary in order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for
which the privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power to issue the pat-
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Second, the protection bestowed by patent law is significantly
stronger than that conferred by trade secret law. Patent protection
bars others from manufacturing, using, selling, and importing the
invention while it is patented. In fact, the protection is so broad
that even if a competitor arrives at the patented invention inde-
pendently and attempts to market it, she will still be liable for in-
fringement; independent development does not shelter one against
an infringement suit."' The protection accorded by trade secret
law, in contrast, is much more limited. Trade secret law protects
the information holder only against improper appropriation by
others. Liability under trade secret law requires a showing of
"breach of contract, violation of a confidential relationship, theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, and other wrongs."' 32 Trade secret law
does not prohibit copying of publicly available products,' nor does
it forbid reverse-engineering.
Third, trade secret protection has no built-in time limit. Unlike
patent protection, which endures for a uniform period of twenty
years, trade secret protection lasts as long as a reasonable effort is
made to keep the information secret, and no competitor succeeds
in appropriating the information by legitimate means-usually by
reverse-engineering. Thus, in principle, trade secrecy may last in
perpetuity.
On first impression, the potentially infinite duration of trade se-
cret protection seems to suggest that trademark protection is use-
less for trade secret holders. A closer examination, however, re-
veals that this conclusion is unwarranted. By its very nature, trade
secret protection is uncertain. Competitors of the trade secret holder
may, at any time, successfully overcome the secrecy legitimately
and appropriate the protected information. Alternatively, they may
ent"); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L &
Econ. 265 (1977) (suggesting that an important aspect of patents is their influence,
through disclosure of new technologies, on future R&D, not their impact on ex ante
incentives to innovate).
' See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,478 (1974) (holding that
unknowing and unintentional duplication of a patented invention is still infringe-
ment).
m See Bone, supra note 125, at 250.
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arrive at the protected information independently. In other words,
the successful continuation of trade secrecy is probabilistic. The
protection may last forever, or end at any given moment. Table 3
gives the expected life of a trade secret, given various annual prob-
abilities that the secret will be discovered.'35 For an annual prob-
ability of detection of 25%, the trade secret's expected life is
twelve years, rising to twenty-seven years for an annual detection
rate of 17.5%.
Table 3: Expected Life of a Trade Secret, for Various Annual Probabilities
of "Discovery" by Rivals
Annual Probability of Discovery I 0.75 I 0.50 1 0.25 0.20 0.1
Expected Life, in Years 0.44 2.00 12.0 20.0 90.0
For our purposes, this fact makes trade secrecy closely analogous
to patent protection, at least for secrets that are moderately likely
to be discovered. Both patent and trade secret give firms the same
advantage: lead-time. In the case of patents the lead-time is certain
and limited, while in the case of trade secret protection the lead-
time is uncertain and potentially unlimited.
The uncertain nature of trade secrecy creates a two-term plan-
ning horizon for the rational trade secret holder-very much as it
did for the rational patentee. The probabilistic event of termina-
tion should prompt the trade secret holder to consider not only the
trade secrecy period, but also the period that follows, in which
trademark is the only available protection. Thus, even in the in-
stances in which trade secrecy bestows a monopoly position;116 a ra-
.
35 The expected life is given by Et-otx(1-A)', where A is the constant probability of
discovery in any year and t is the number of years since the secret originated.
'3 Because trade secret law protects non-novel information, and because the protec-
tion accorded by trade secrets is weaker than that conferred by patents, not every in-
stance of trade secret protection raises a monopoly problem. At the same time, trade
secrecy also extends to inventions that could, in principle, be patented. In such cases,
inventors will choose trade secret over patent protection only if their expected reve-
nues from trade secrecy exceed their expected revenues from patent protection. This
will happen when: (1) patent infringements are difficult to prove (as is sometimes the
case with process patents); (2) the patentee lacks the wherewithal to afford litigation;
or (3) trade secrecy grants the inventor a monopoly that is expected to last longer
than the statutory patent period. Obviously, the latter scenario is the most troubling
since it imposes a potentially greater deadweight loss than patent protection, and no
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tional trade secret holder should sacrifice some of her monopolistic
rents during the secrecy period in order to enhance her brand rec-
ognition and preserve higher revenues in the trademark period. As
with patent protection, the need to rely on trademark protection in
the future curbs the trade secret holder's penchant to price mono-
polistically.
One important difference between our analysis of patent and
trade secrecy protection concerns the timing of the decision to re-
duce prices. The probabilistic nature of trade secrecy implies that
trade secret holders will lower prices earlier than patentees will.
Since patentees are assured twenty years of exclusivity, they will
optimally choose to price monopolistically in the early years of the
patent, and lower prices only as expiration nears. Trade secret hold-
ers face a different calculus.
Assume, for example, that Energy, Inc. holds a trade secret for a
chemical composition used in solar panels. The company estimates
that there is a substantial probability that its rivals will learn the
formula of its vaunted trade secret in the first few years following
its introduction. Under these circumstances, the company will want
to utilize trademark protection right away in order to offset the
imminent risk of its secret being revealed. The need to rely on
trademark protection early in the product's life increases the pres-
sure on trade secret holders to invest in brand loyalty from the
start of the product life cycle, rather than exploiting their" market
exclusivity in the early years as patent holders do. The earlier tim-
ing of the price reduction in the case of trade secret protection thus
increases the efficiency gains from trademark leverage.
B. Copyright
Copyright protection extends to any original expressive work
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Like patent protection,
copyright protection is limited in time. The first federal Copyright
Act of 1790 limited the statutory subject matter to books, maps,
and charts.3 Through time, the subject matter of copyright law has
dramatically expanded, and it presently includes musical works,"
disclosure is made to the public.
See Joyce et al., supra note 6, at 20.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000).
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sculptural works,'139 audiovisual works,140 architectural works, 141 de-
signs,42 and computer software. 43
The expansion of copyrightable subject matter has not only en-
gendered a degree of subject matter overlap between copyright
and patent law, but has also increased the importance of trademark
protection for copyright holders. Like patentees and trade secret
holders, copyright holders can rely on trademark protection to
maintain a proprietary interest in their works even after the copy-
right protection expires. Thus, it is not surprising that Disney
trademarked many of its famous animated characters in addition to
copyrighting them.'44 Similarly, Microsoft can combine copyright
and trademark in protecting its software, and the Italian designer
Alessi can employ the same combination to protect his innovative
designs.
139 Id. § 102(a)(5).
,oId. § 102(a)(6).
"
1 1d. § 102(a)(8).
Copyrightable designs include statuettes, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217
(1954) (holding that the patentability of the statuettes did not bar them from copy-
right protection as works of art), and belt buckles, see Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that belt buckles are copy-
rightable because their primary ornamental function is conceptually separable from
their subsidiary utilitarian function), but may not include animal nose masks, see
Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that the artistic element of animal shapes is conceptually inseparable from their
utilitarian purpose of creating humor), or mannequins, see Carol Barnhart, Inc. v.
Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,418 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that mannequins arc not
copyrightable because their the aesthetic and artistic features are inseparable from
their use as utilitarian articles).
Besides being protected through the doctrine of conceptual separability, future de-
signs may be protected through sui generis copyright regimes, or through patent or
trademark laws. See Joyce et al., supra note 6, at 200-01.
"-'See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (carv-
ing out a substantial fair use exception for "reverse-engineering"); Apple Computer v.
Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that object code is copy-
rightable); Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983)
(suggesting that computer programs are proper subject matter for copyright protec-
tion). Besides being protected by traditional copyright protection, computer software
also may be protected by patent, see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88,193 n.15
(1981) (upholding the patentability of an invention related to computer software), or
by state trade secret law, state contract law, "shrink-wrap" licensing, or "click-on" li-
censing. See Joyce et al., supra note 6, at 176-77.
'" See Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public
Domain, 11 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 429,429 (1994).
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How will the trademark leverage affect the pricing decisions of
copyright holders? We predict that the combination of copyright
and trademark might mitigate the anti-competitive effects of copy-
right protection in some cases, but we expect the typical efficiency
gains to be small. There are several reasons for the difference be-
tween patent and copyright leverage. First, trademark protection is
virtually irrelevant to most types of copyrighted works, such as
paintings, sculptures, and even movies. Once a film falls into the
public domain, few consumers will pay more for a copy released by
the original studio when identical copies are available on the mar-
ket for less.
Second, consumers buy most copyrighted work for self-consumption
only once; for most copyrighted works, there is no possibility of repeat
sales. Once Jane owns a CD of Nirvana's "Nevermind," she can lis-
ten to the copyrighted music as much as she likes without buying
another copy. The likelihood of Jane purchasing another copy of
her favorite novel, James Joyce's "Ulysses," is even lower.
Third, copyright protection is so long as to render the additional
protection term afforded by trademark law virtually meaningless.
The current copyright term is life of author plus seventy years for
individually created works, and ninety-five years from publication
or 120 years from creation (whichever is shorter) for works made
for hire.' As Judge Posner explained, "as a result of discounting to
present value..., the knowledge that you may be entitled to a
royalty on your book fifty to one hundred years after you publish it
is unlikely to affect your behavior today."'4 Therefore, before a
work is created, the effect of trademark protection on the incentive
to create is extremely small.
Moreover, the commercial life span of copyrighted products for
which trademark protection is relevant is considerably shorter than
the copyright term. Consider software: While branding certainly
matters for software providers, copyrighted software becomes ob-
solete years before the copyright in the software expires. Thus, fu-
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (setting out the duration of copyright protection). In
the case of "works made for hire," the employer is considered the author of the work
and is regarded as the initial owner of the copyright unless the parties have agreed
otherwise. See id. § 201(b).
"'6Posner, supra note 10, at 46-47. At a 5% annual interest rate, $1 in 100 years is
worth only $0.007-ess than a penny-in present value.
2002] 1499
Virginia Law Review
ture trademark protection gives software providers no incentive to
increase sales at present in the hope of making additional sales af-
ter the copyright protection ends.
Nonetheless, there may be some instances in which intra-brand
spillovers may induce copyright owners to cut prices of copyrighted
products in order to increase brand loyalty. Since most copyrighted
works are experience goods, the purchasing decisions of consumers
will, to some extent, be influenced by past consumption of other
products of the same brand. In light of this fact, copyright holders
may find it in their best interest to reduce prices of popular copy-
righted products to attract consumers to try other products of the
same brand. For example, Blue Note, the famous jazz label, may
rationally reduce the price of copyrighted recordings to entice jazz
lovers to purchase the label's other recordings. Likewise, Penguin,
the respected publishing house, may not extract the full rent af-
forded it by copyright protection on its current bestseller in order
to convince consumers to buy its edition of "The Dialogues of
Plato" and other public domain classics. So, at the margin, con-
cerns for intra-brand spillovers' may induce copyright holders to
price more competitively.
1 47
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
Patent policy embodies a tradeoff between dynamic and static
efficiency. On the one hand, if innovations can be freely copied,
innovators will have no way of appropriating any of the gains they
generate, nor of recovering the costs they have incurred in research
and development. On the other hand, however, the prices of the
innovations would be low, and every consumer who values the
product at more than its cost would be able to purchase it.
In the absence of patents, then, there would be essentially no
static deadweight loss, but society would incur serious dynamic in-
efficiencies by eliminating much of the incentive to innovate. This,
however, is not the balance society has chosen between dynamic
and static efficiency. Instead, we have elected to grant the patentee
a limited duration monopoly, allowing her to restrict output and
charge monopolistic prices. This enables the patentee to appropri-
4
,We discuss spillovers in the patent context. See supra text accompanying notes
94-99.
1500 [Vol. 88:1455
Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property
ate more of the benefits of her innovation, and thereby provides an
incentive to invest in R&D. The downside is that it comes at the
cost of static deadweight loss, since invention prices are now set
monopolistically, and some consumers who value the product at
more than its marginal cost are unable to purchase it.
Thus, any level of patent protection implies a corresponding
deadweight loss. Importantly, both the incentive to innovate and
static deadweight loss vary directly with the length of the patent
term. Increasing dynamic incentives thus necessarily increases
static losses, hence the tradeoff.
As we have shown, however, patents are not the only means for
encouraging innovation; trademarks may complement patents in
promoting this goal. The net effect of combined patent and trade-
mark protection is a stronger incentive to innovate than that con-
templated by Congress.'4 The increased protection, moreover, comes
at no cost to society. In fact, it improves social welfare. Our analysis
has demonstrated that leveraged patents produce three effects.
First, leveraged patents induce patentees to produce more, and
price more competitively than they would under a patent whose ef-
fect ends at expiration, as is traditionally assumed. Second, this ad-
ditional output leads to lower static deadweight losses while the
patent is in effect, but higher overall profits for the patentee, and,
hence, yields greater ex ante incentives to innovate than a conven-
tional patent. Third, consumers who remain loyal to the patentee's
product after the patent expires pay more than they need to, since
they could avail themselves of a competitive product at a lower
price. This effect, however, is purely redistributive: The consumers'
loss is exactly equal to the patentee's gain, with no deadweight loss.
These observations have important consequences for innovation
policy. They imply, for example, that patents may be shortened,
and their attendant deadweight loss reduced, without diminishing
the incentive to innovate provided by existing patent protection.
Conversely, incentives to innovate may be increased without im-
posing additional deadweight loss on society.
"
8 A review of the legislative history of Title 35 of the U.S. Code fails to disclose any
reference to trademark. Neither the Congress that passed the original Patent Act, nor
any subsequent Congress that amended the Act, mentioned the possibility of enhane-
ig the incentive to create through a combination of patent and trademark.
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In the remainder of this Part, we analyze the Supreme Court's
approach to leveraged patents and demonstrate why the current
judicial hostility is misguided. We then explain how legal policy
should take advantage of leveraged patents to encourage innova-
tion while reducing deadweight loss.
A. Pitfalls in the Supreme Court's Approach to Leverage
Driven by strong hostility to the practice, the Supreme Court in
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.149 and Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co.' 50 thwarted attempts at leveraging pat-
ents through trademarks by dramatically diminishing the trade-
mark protection available to patented inventions.'51 In both cases,
the Court ruled that the generic name by which a patented inven-
tion has become known falls into the public domain at the expira-
tion of the patent.152 In Singer, the Court even permitted competi-
tors to affix the name "Singer" to their sewing machines, thereb Y
completely eliminating the possibility of trademark leverage."
Harkening back to this conception, the Court, in TrafFix Devices v.
Marketing Displays, held that expiration of a utility patent on a
mechanism for keeping outdoor signs upright in inclement weather
creates a rebuttable presumption that the particular design is ineli-
gible for trade dress protection. 54
Our analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court's hostility to
leveraged patents is ill-conceived. Not only did the Court fail to see
the efficiencies generated by leveraged patents, but it also chose
the least desirable intervention method. By restricting patentees'
ability to leverage patents through trademarks, the Supreme Court
"'9163 U.S. 169 (1896).
154305 U.S. 111 (1938).
.See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. A possible variant on the Supreme
Court's approach is to set a time limit on the trademark protection afforded to pat-
entees. Under this approach, the names of previously patented products would be en-
titled to full trademark protection, but the protection would lapse after a certain pe-
riod of time, by which point the name would fall into the public domain. While better
than the Supreme Court's approach, this solution weakens the value of trademark
protection to patentees, and thus, eliminates some of the patentee's incentive to lower
prices during the patent's life.
... Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118; Singer, 163 U.S. at 199.
Singer, 163 U.S. at 199-200.
15 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001).
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has enhanced the incentive for patentees to price monopolistically
during the patent life. Any diminution in the scope of trademark
protection available to patentees increases the relative value of
their patent monopoly, and, correspondingly, forces them to rely
on monopolistic rents to recover their investment in R&D. Thus,
the net effect of the Court's policy is to increase the distortionary
effect of patent protection and diminish social welfare.
In fact, the Supreme Court got it exactly backwards-marks that
do not designate patented products should be subjected to height-
ened scrutiny since they do not generate the same leverage effect
as marks of patented products. This point leads to a more general
insight. In recent years, there has been a spate of criticism of the
expansion of trademark protection.'55 While we do not seek to jus-
tify this expansion generally, we wish to note its beneficial effect in
the context of leveraged patents. To the extent that enhanced
trademark protection facilitates brand recognition, it is easier for
patentees to preserve their loyal customer base, thus increasing the
value of each sale made during the patent term. Therefore, the
more trademark law protects branding, the stronger the incentive
for patentees to reduce prices during the patent's life.
The Court's misunderstanding of leveraged patents has led to a
perverse result: While trademark protection generally has dramati-
cally expanded, the protection afforded to marks of patented prod-
ucts has been set at a minimal level. We submit that it should go
the other way around. Courts should grant stronger trademark pro-
tection to marks designating patented innovations than they do to
other marks.
Trade dress protection, however, calls for a more nuanced analy-
sis.15' Trade dress protection covers "the appearance or image of
goods or services as presented to prospective purchasers."'" In ana-
lyzing trade dress protection for previously patented products, it is
critical to distinguish between the aesthetic design elements and
"5 See Lemley, supra note 13, at 1688 (suggesting that by protecting trademark
owners against uses that would not have been infringements even a few years ago and
protecting as trademarks things that would not have received such protection in the
past, courts "are well on their way to divorcing trademarks entirely from the goods
they are supposed to represent"); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopo-
lies, 48 Emory LJ. 367 (1999) (attacking expansion of trademark protection).
We are grateful to Mark Lemley for pointing this out to us.
L57 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 16 (1995).
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the functional configurations for which the utility patent was
awarded. While we support extending trade dress protection to the
aesthetic design elements of patented products, we oppose its ex-
tension to patented product configurations. The reason is simple:
Whereas protecting aesthetic design elements increases the lever-
age effect, protecting patented product configurations eliminates
leverage altogether. The effect of extending trade dress protection
to patented product configurations would be to give patentees per-
petual exclusivity over those features. Naturally, under a legal re-
gime in which patents do not expire, patentees would not need to
rely on brand loyalty, and consequently, would have no incentive
to reduce the price of patented products.58
B. Relaxing the Tradeoff Between Dynamic and Static Efficiency
By conferring limited exclusivity upon inventors, patents affect ef-
ficiency in two ways: They spur innovation, but generate a dead-
weight loss. The first effect is positive and dynamic, the second is
negative and static. This means that policymakers cannot simply
choose the level of patent protection that maximizes the incentive
to innovate, nor can they select a level of patent protection that
minimizes social deadweight loss. Rather, they must choose a pro-
tection level that strikes the right balance between the dynamic ef-
ficiency gain and the static efficiency loss. The current protection
term-twenty years from filing-presumably reflects Congress's
judgment that any further incentives to innovate would not be
worthwhile, given the additional static deadweight loss entailed by
an extension of the term.
Conventional theorizing mistakenly assumes that patents exclu-
sively determine the terms-or the "welfare possibility frontier"-
of the tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency. On this view,
In fact, this is exactly what the respondent, Marketing Displays Inc. ("MDI"), at-
tempted to do in TrafFix. MDI sought to obtain trade dress protection for its previ-
ously patented "dual spring mechanism" used for keeping outdoor signs upright in
inclement weather conditions. Denying MDI's request, the Supreme Court ruled that
MDI's expired utility patent is strong evidence that the dual spring mechanism is
functional, and thus, ineligible for trade dress protection. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30.
Although the Court's analysis was doctrinal, and despite the fact that it relied on the
insular view of intellectual property law that we criticized earlier, it reached the cor-
rect decision. Our analysis provides an independent, policy-oriented justification for
the ruling.
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any deviation from the current level of protection is undesirable
since it entails a social cost. Specifically, it is not possible to further
enhance dynamic efficiency by increasing the incentive to innovate
without also increasing social deadweight loss, nor is it possible to
lower social deadweight loss by shortening patents without simul-
taneously diminishing the incentive to innovate.
Our analysis of leveraged patents demonstrates that the terms of
the tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency are not as re-
strictive as previously thought. As we have shown, trademark pro-
tection can increase the payoff to patentees, and thereby enhance
the incentive to innovate, while reducing the deadweight loss gen-
erated by patents. By relaxing the tradeoff between static and dy-
namic efficiency, leveraged patents shift outwards the possibility
frontier delineated by patents. Consequently, they create new
combinations of incentives to innovate and deadweight loss that
are unavailable under discrete patent protection.
For example, the outward shift of the possibility frontier makes
it possible to shorten patent terms without any dynamic efficiency
sacrifices. Since leveraged patents have higher profitability than
non-leveraged patents, the term of protection for leveraged patents
may be shortened without reducing incentives to innovate below
those contemplated by Congress for a non-leveraged patent. As
long as the drop in profits due to the shorter patent term is lower
than (or equal to) the gains from trademark protection, shortening
patents would not adversely affect dynamic efficiency; it would at
the same time lower the static deadweight loss caused by patent
protection.
Conversely, leveraged patents enable policymakers to improve
dynamic efficiency while maintaining static deadweight loss at the
level of ordinary patents. Given that the static deadweight loss of
leveraged patents is smaller than that of non-leveraged ones, poli-
cymakers might wish to increase the protection term for leveraged
patents. Since society is willing to put up with deadweight loss of
non-leveraged patents, the duration of leveraged patents may be
extended until the corresponding deadweight loss equals that of
non-leveraged patents. Extending the duration would increase the




Figure 1 illustrates the argument graphically. It shows that for a
standard patent (no leverage) there is a tradeoff between patentee
profits (incentives to innovate) and static deadweight loss. To give
the patentee higher profits, we have to lengthen the patent term,
which increases the duration of the patentee's monopoly power
and attendant distortionary pricing.
As previously discussed, however, the existence of leveraged
patents pushes out the "welfare possibility frontier," making possi-
ble a range of new alternatives, all of which offer both larger incen-
tives to innovate and smaller deadweight loss than a standard pat-
ent. Hence, any point in the area formed by A, B, and C represents
an unambiguous welfare improvement over the initial point A
(which represents a non-leveraged twenty-year patent). For exam-
ple, a 21.5-year leveraged patent has the same deadweight loss as a
twenty-year standard patent, but higher patentee profits. An eight-
een-year leveraged patent has the same incentives to innovate as a
twenty-year standard patent, but smaller deadweight loss.
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FIGURE 1: "WELFARE PossIBILrrY FRONTIERS" FOR PATENTS WITH AND
WITHOUT LEVERAGE
Table 4 provides a numerical example. It shows that as com-
pared with a conventional twenty-year patent, a leveraged patent
of the same length generates 2.8% higher profits and 9.4% less
deadweight loss in net present value terms. To reduce static ineffi-
ciencies while maintaining the original level of profitability, poli-
cymakers could cut the patent length to roughly 18 years, diminish-
ing deadweight loss by almost 13%, while keeping the patentee's
profits the same. Alternatively, to raise incentives to innovate
without increasing static inefficiency, the patent term could be ex-
tended to approximately 21.5 years, thereby increasing incentives
to invest in R&D by 10.7%, while leaving deadweight loss slightly




Table 4: Innovation Incentive and Deadweight Loss Under Conventional &
Leveraged Patents, for Alternative Patent Lengths'"
Conventional Leveraged Patent
Patent Term
20 years 20 years 18 years 21.5 years
NPV Patentee's Profits 21,284 21,878 21,275 24,505
Percent Increase - 2.8 0.0 10.7
vs. Col. 1
NPV Deadweight Loss 10,642 9,647 9,275 10,452
Percent Decrease - 9.4 12.8 0.02
vs. Col. 1 1 1
C. Tailoring and Defaults
An obvious problem with the foregoing analysis is that it as-
sumes that policymakers can determine which patents are subject
to trademark leverage and tailor their responses accordingly. In re-
ality, policymakers may often be unable to do so. The state of cur-
rent theorizing in this area is very unsatisfactory, and as our earlier
discussion makes clear,16 we lack the ability to make accurate pre-
dictions about when brand loyalty, and hence trademark leverage,
are likely to be important. One should be wary of any theoretical
improvement that requires superhuman policymakers or unfeasible
information to make it more easily implemented.
This does not mean that our findings are of no policy relevance,
however. We suggest that informational constraints can to some
extent be overcome by allowing patentees to tailor their own pat-
ent or trademark protection from a menu proposed by regulators.
Technically, we propose a separating equilibrium, in which policy-
makers can induce patentees to behave optimally even when pat-
"9 Based on Appendix, assuming myopic consumers and parameter values a = 100,
b = 1, S = 10, r = 0.1.
6 See supra text accompanying notes 85-99.
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entees have private information (about the extent of leverage) that
regulators do not know.
161
For example, suppose that policymakers determine that they
wanted to reduce deadweight loss below that contemplated under
current patent law (for non-leveraged patents) and are happy to
keep patentee's incentives to innovate at current levels. They could
then offer patentees a choice between a patent lasting twenty years
with no trademark leverage and a leveraged patent of eighteen
years. As Table 4 demonstrates, these two schemes produce the
same profits for the patentee when leverage is possible. Further-
more, for those cases in which patentees recognize that they are
not in a position to exploit leverage,'6 they will simply choose the
standard patent term (with no trademark protection, which would
be valueless to them in any case).
A comparison of columns 1 and 3 in Table 4 reveals that this
"tailoring" approach guarantees that all patentees will have at least
the level of protection contemplated by Congress (compare col-
umn 1, row 2 with column 3, row 2). For those patentees who ex-
ploit trademark leverage, deadweight loss is reduced by almost
13% compared to conventional patents. Policymakers do not have
to know whether patentees plan to exploit trademark leverage or
not. By offering a menu of choices, patentees can be induced to se-
lect the option that reduces deadweight loss by as much as possible
without sacrificing incentives to innovate.
There are two problems with this approach that must be noted.
First, although policymakers do not need to know which firms or
industries will exploit trademark leverage and which will not, they
do need to know the relevant parameter values underlying the pat-
"'Professors Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz were the first to describe an
equilibrium in which one party (the insurer) induces separation between two un-
known types (of insureds) by offering a menu of contracts that lead each type to
choose a different contract. See Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Informa-
tion, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629 (1976). Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced
ideas of pooling and separating equilibria into legal theory. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale LU. 87 (1989).
2As we explained earlier, in Section 11.B, not all products are equally "leverage-
able." Presumably, patentees have better information than regulators about whether




entee's decision problem, including the size of switching costs, in-
terest rates, and the slope of the demand curve. This information is
important because it determines the profitability of the leveraged
patent, and hence sets the patent term that provides equivalent
profits to a twenty-year term with no leverage.
This problem is not as serious as it first seems, however. Suppose
that policymakers are completely ignorant of the underlying pa-
rameters and offer patentees a choice between nineteen years of
patent protection with trademark protection on expiration or twenty
years with no trademark protection. Some patentees who select the
first option would have to be willing to give up an additional year
of protection (as illustrated by Table 4), so the policy does not
achieve the minimum feasible deadweight loss. Nevertheless, it still
reduces deadweight loss as compared with the status quo and
hence represents an unambiguous improvement."
A more significant difficulty is that the menu approach only
works in one direction. Suppose that policymakers wish to provide
more incentives to innovate than currently contemplated under a
non-leveraged twenty-year patent. Table 4 reveals that with lever-
age, patent terms could be extended to 21.5 years without increas-
ing deadweight loss over a twenty-year conventional patent. This
would have the effect of increasing patentee profits by almost 11%,
as in column 4. There is, however, no way to offer this option only
to those firms that wish to exploit trademark leverage. All firms
will prefer a 21.5-year patent to a twenty-year patent, regardless of
whether they will utilize trademark leverage or not. But if the pat-
entee does not utilize leverage (and, thus, cuts prices while the pat-
ent is in effect), then the longer patent term unambiguously increases
deadweight loss.1"
VI. OBJECTIONS AND ADDITIONAL FACTORS
In this Part, we discuss three additional factors that might com-
plicate the story we want to tell about the importance of trademark
"A similar argument can be made in reverse: If policy makers set the leverage-
inclusive patent term too low, no firms would prefer this alternative to the status quo.
But this simply leaves us where we started and does no harm.
"Trademark leverage is thus like a string: It can be used to pull patentees in one
direction (same profits but lower deadweight loss), but not to push them in the other
(higher profits, same deadweight loss).
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leverage and brand loyalty as a supplement to patent protection.
Does it matter that firms can seek to develop brand loyalty by ad-
vertising, rather than by expanding output, during the patent pe-
riod? How does the introduction of discounting and multiple peri-
ods affect our results? And, finally, is our model vulnerable to the
empirical finding that, at least for certain pharmaceuticals, prices in
reality rise-rather than fall-on the expiration of the patent?
A. Advertising
In the real world, patentees always have the option of trying to
build brand loyalty by advertising as well as, or instead of, cutting
prices and developing a base of experienced users. How does the
possibility of advertising affect our conclusions?
One possibility is that advertising could substitute for greater
output as a method of creating brand loyalty. If patent holders re-
spond to the possibility of trademark leverage by attempting to
create loyalty through increased advertising, rather than through
increased sales, then the efficiency gains we described earlier may
not be realized.1i While this is certainly a possibility, we argue that
neither the theory nor the empirical evidence support this view.
We turn first to considerations of theory. In a classic article writ-
ten nearly fifty years ago, Professors Dorfman and Steiner devised
a simple formula for the optimal ratio of advertising expenditures
to total sales of a product.1 Their equation says that the optimal
advertising/sales ratio is
a= -1J',
where ij is the elasticity of quantity sold with respect to advertising
and np is the conventional price elasticity of demand.' 67
'6On the basis of their asymmetric information model of consumer search costs,
Moshkin and Shachar suggest that the growth in the total volume of products avail-
able increases "individuals' ignorance of the attributes of the alternative [products
they do not consume]. The increase in ignorance is the asset of the large and estab-
lished firms. Advertising rather than price cuts are the penetration tool of new firms
and those which are growth-oriented." Moshkin & Shachar, supra note 98, at 28.
These broad conclusions lack empirical support, however.
" Dorfman & Steiner, supra note 18, at 828.
16Id. Technically, % is the percent change in quantity demanded from a 1% in-




To see the intuition for this result, imagine that the firm can in-
crease its quantity sold by one unit by means of either a $x increase
in advertising or a $z drop in price. A profit-maximizing firm will
want the incremental profit from either course of action to be the
same. The more effective advertising is (the greater the demand
shift per dollar spent), and the less effective cutting prices are (the
smaller the movement along the demand curve per dollar drop in
price), the better the advertising looks relative to cutting prices.
To apply the DorfmanSteiner insight in our context, we begin
by noting that the case for trademark leverage is strongest for ex-
perience goods, which, as we stated earlier, are products whose at-
tributes cannot be appreciated except through actual consumption.
But the more a product resembles an experience good, the less
likely it would be that advertising could substitute for actual use of
the product in creating new demand. In the Dorfman/Steiner ter-
minology, 7l--the efficacy of advertising-should be low for ex-
perience goods. It follows that patentees would be more likely to
develop brand loyalty by inducing additional use (increasing quan-
tity and decreasing price), rather than by expanding advertising.
Moreover, we would expect to see more price-cutting and less
advertising for those products where leverage is strongest. Even if
we assume that leverage has no effect on the efficacy of advertis-
ing, the fact of leverage increases the long run price elasticity of
demand. That is, a given drop in price has a bigger effect on total
quantity demanded over the two periods with leverage than with-
out it. Hence, not only does leverage make the numerator of the
Dorfman/Steiner ratio smaller, it plausibly makes the denominator
larger.
In sum, patentees should engage in less advertising per dollar of
sales with leverage than without it. Regardless of whether advertis-
" The pioneering work of Phillip Nelson demonstrates that advertising may be a
credible signal of product quality, even for "experience goods" for which important
qualities are discernable only by direct consumption of the good. See Nelson, Adver-
tising as Information, supra note 46, at 732. Advertising expenditures are a credible
signal of product quality because they are only profitable if the firm is in business for
the long term, and not a fly-by-night operation.
Professor Henry Smith pointed to another reason why %a may fall as the patent
nears expiration: Advertising for the patented product may spillover to its generic
competitors, so that some of the benefit to the patentee 'leaks' away to its rivals. This
of course makes advertising less attractive to the patentee.
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ing enhances or reduces welfare, the effects of leverage-the fact
that selling more now allows for more sales later as well-will,
other things equal, tend to reduce advertising. All this does not say
that the patentee will engage in no advertising. It merely suggests
that advertising will not be an attractive substitute for cutting
prices in the case most important to our argument.
There is not much empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween patents and advertising. One recent and extremely careful
study by Professors Berndt, Ling, and Kyle, however, looked at
marketing expenditures for patented drugs as the patent lapsed
and the products were reintroduced as over-the-counter medi-
cines. 69 They found that marketing declined substantially as patent
expiration neared. (The decline was even more pronounced with
the onset of generic competition after the patent ended.) This is
precisely the time when the patentee will be increasing output and
lowering price to generate new customers and brand loyalty.'"
Hence, the empirical evidence is at least consistent with our predic-
tion that leverage leads to less advertising, rather than more. Sur-
veying a variety of studies, Professor Robinson and his colleagues
support this conclusion, noting that "industry studies and cross-
sectional evidence consistently show that market pioneers spend
less as a percentage of sales on advertising and promotion." '
B. Discounting and Dynamic Issues
Our simple model has only a single period in which the patent is
in effect, followed by a single period when the product is protected,
if at all, only by its trademark and brand loyalty. This Section dem-
onstrates the conditions under which our conclusions are sensitive
to this assumption. A more complex model-in which patent pro-
tection lasts for twenty years and is followed by trademark protec-
1' Ernst R, Berndt et al., The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration: Do RX to OTC
Switches Provide an Afterlife? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Conference on
Research in Income and Wealth, Symposium on Scanner Data and Price Indexes,
Sept. 15-16,2000).
- Id. at 20 tbl. 1. For Tagamet, the authors found that total marketing expenses as a
percent of sales fell by 43.1% as patent expiration approached and by 30.1% follow-
ing expiration. ("Total" here means pages of journal advertising plus number of sales
visits to doctors.) For Zantac, the figures are 59.8% as the patent neared expiration,
with an additional 13% after expiration, for a total reduction of 72.8%. Id.
Robinson et al., supra note 107, at 18.
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tion extending into the infinite future-does not alter the results as
long as consumers have a short time horizon or do not anticipate
the future.
When consumers are infinitelylived and forward-looking, how-
ever, the patentee's price can not deviate much from the competi-
tive level, since consumers will willingly incur a switching cost to
"buy" the opportunity to purchase at the competitive price for the
infinite future unless the savings from doing so are very small.
Hence, brand loyalty essentially vanishes, and our story about
building brand loyalty by increasing output is no longer plausible.'
The more elaborate model generates two important conclusions.
First, the trademark-leveraged patentee will always produce more
than the "pure" patentee (one who generates no brand loyalty or
has no trademark protection) in every period before the patent ex-
pires. Second, the leveraged patentee's optimal output rises over
time during the patent period, with the bulk of the increase as the
patent nears expiration. Output then drops once the patent expires.
We summarize these conclusions in Figure 2, which graphs opti-
mal output, assuming that leverage is possible and that the amount
of brand loyalty depends on the average volume of consumers
served during the patent period. 1 It shows that the patentee's op-
timal output in the first year of the patent is infinitesimally above
the single-period monopoly level. As expiration approaches, how-
ever, output rises to more than 30% above the single period mo-
nopoly level, then falls substantially once the patent expires. Our
theory is thus at least roughly consistent with the dynamics dis-
" We formalize this insight in the Appendix and demonstrate that there will still be
a small brand-loyalty effect even in this case. See infra Appendix. Note that this prob-
lem is common to "rational expectations"-type critiques of models with myopic be-
havior. It has the potential to occur in almost every model of switching costs, although
it does not appear to have received much attention because most such models use
only two periods.
Brand loyalty is both intuitively plausible and one of the best-documented facts in
the marketing literature. See Kotler, supra note 94, at 444-45, 447, 449; I.P.L. Png &
David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & Econ.
207 (1995). If it turns out to be incompatible with the assumption of perfect foresight,
so much the worse for that assumption.
7 See infra Appendix for an explanation of the technical details. The demand curve
is assumed to be linear with parameters a = 100 and b = 1. The switching cost is 10,
and the interest rate is 10%. We assume that consumers look only at the current pe-
riod, rather than predicting their own future behavior (myopia).
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cussed in the case studies, where patentees seemed to reserve the
bulk of their price-cutting and attempts to build market-share for
the patent's twilight years.
lAn -1
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FIGURE 2: PATENTEE'S OPTIMAL OUTPUT OVER TIME GIVEN
TRADEMARK LEVERAGE, AS PERCENT OF SINGLE-PERIOD MONOPOLY
OPTIMUM
C. Prices Rise on Expiration of the Patent?
Some theories predict that the price of a patented product will
not fall, and may in fact rise, in response to the entry of generic
competition, when the market is divisible into brand-loyal and
price-sensitive consumers. 74 Moreover, there is empirical evidence
'74 See Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of
Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 75, 76-77 (1997) [hereinafter Frank &
Salkever, Generic Entry]; Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Pricing, Patent Loss
and the Market for Pharmaceuticals, 59 S. Econ. J. 165,165-66 (1992).
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that this happens, at least in some instances.175 Is this a problem for
our theory?
We start by noting that pricing in Period 2 has no efficiency con-
sequences in our model. As long as there are firms entering at the
competitive price, then every consumer who should be served in
the second period will be. True, some will pay more for the product
than they could if they bought from the entrants at the competitive
price, and this price discrimination does, of course, have distribu-
tional consequences that we might care about independently. There
are, however, no distortions to worry about in the post-patent pe-
riod, and the fact that the incumbent firm charges a higher price to
its brand-loyal customers is not, per se, an efficiency problem.176
We do, however, care about leverage-that is, whether the pos-
sibility of retaining some customers in Period 2 induces the pat-
entee to raise output and lower prices in Period 1. Is the raising of
prices in Period 2 (focusing only on brand-loyal customers) incon-
sistent with our prediction that the patent holder will increase out-
put in Period 1 to create additional loyal users? Although our
model predicts that the patentee's price for the branded product
will fall, rather than rise, when facing generic competition, the an-
swer to this question is "no."
We need to complicate our story by taking account of heteroge-
neous brand loyalty by, for example, allowing for randomly dis-
tributed switching costs in Period 2 among those who bought the
product in Period 1.177 It still makes sense for the patentee to ex-
pand sales in Period 1 in the hopes of landing someone with a
(randomly) high switching cost-someone who can then be kept in
Period 2, even at a price that is much higher than the generic sub-
stitute. If only a small fraction of the population has high switching
" Berndt and his colleagues found that "neither Tagamet Rx nor Zantac Rx
adopted a policy of competing with generics on price following patent expiration, and
instead increased prices. As a consequence, they lost very substantial market share,
but retained sales to a small, relatively price-insensitive segment of brand-loyal con-
sumers." Berndt et al., supra note 169, at 23. Frank & Salkever, Generic Entry, supra
note 174, at 83, present further empirical evidence of this behavior vis-il-vis other
brand name drugs.
176 Michael Pereira pointed out to us that further distributional problems might arise
if, for example, low-income or poorly informed consumers remain loyal to the pat-
entee's brand purely because they lack information about the existence or compara-
bility of the generic substitute.
"7 For a model of this type, see Gabszewicz et al., supra note 71, at 399-401.
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costs, it may make sense to charge 10% of the people a high price,
abandoning the other consumers to generic competition, rather
than charging, say, 30% of the consumers a lower price.
In sum, the fact that some sellers raise, rather than lower, prices
on expiration of their patents does not reverse any of the conclu-
sions of our model. Of course, the extent of leverage is still an em-
pirical question, but the existence of leverage is not at all incom-
patible with an upward rather than a downward movement of price
once the patent expires.
D. Alternative Proposals
A final objection one might raise is that there are alternative
mechanisms for reducing the deadweight loss associated with pat-
ent grants. The two competing proposals are Professor Tandon's
model of patents with optimal compulsory licensing'a and the
model of probabilistic enforcement created by Professors Ayres
and Klemperer. 179 Essentially, both of these proposals are predi-
cated on the same principle: reducing the patentee's protection
while extending the patent term. While consideration of these
competing proposals is certainly illuminating, it bears emphasis
that neither of them concerns the problem we analyze-the inter-
action between different modes of intellectual property protection.
Thus, neither Tandon's nor Ayres and Klemperer's proposal
presents a facial challenge to our findings.'o Furthermore, the com-
peting models are completely theoretic, whereas leveraged patents
are a real world phenomenon. Notwithstanding these key differ-
ences, we will show that insofar as reducing the deadweight loss as-
sociated with patent protection is concerned, leveraged patents
have both important theoretic and practical advantages over both
compulsory licensing and probabilistic enforcement.
" See Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. Pol. Econ.
470 (1982).
'"See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
Inunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985 (1999).To a degree, our proposal is compatible with either of them, since one could
imagine, for example, leveraged probabilistic patents, or leveraged patents with com-
pulsory licensing.
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1. Compulsory Licensing
In an important theoretical article, Tandon suggests an ideal
patent system with optimal royalty rates-ones that "optimally
trade off the negative incentive effects of licensing with the positive
consumer price effects"" 81-and an infinite patent life. His basic in-
sight is that society would maximize the gains from patent protec-
tion by subjecting all patents to compulsory licensing and simulta-
neously lengthening the life of patents1 2The compulsory rates force
the patentees not to price monopolistically, while the longer pro-
tection term preserves the incentive to invest in R&D. The lion's
share of the gains comes from the reduction in the deadweight loss
engendered by patents; a considerably smaller improvement results
from extending the protection term.
Leveraged patents have several advantages over compulsory li-
censing. First, Tandon's apparatus critically depends on the setting
of optimal compulsory license rates, presumably by the courts or
Congress. This task, however, is well beyond the ability of most
judges or lawmakers. In fact, courts and Congress face tremendous
difficulties deciding reasonable royalty rates in intellectual property
cases.18 These difficulties stem from the uniqueness of intellectual
goods and from the risk element inherent in the inventive process.
The royalty rate must adequately compensate the patentee not
only for the cost of producing the patented invention, but also for
the cost of the many research projects that have failed to yield a
patentable result. Setting the royalty rate too low would have a
chilling effect on innovation; setting it too high would reintroduce
the problem of deadweight loss and might even aggravate it.
As Tandon succinctly cautions, "[f]urther work is needed to sug-
gest practical approaches to realizing the potential welfare gains
which have been discussed."' 84 An important advantage of our self-
selection scheme lies in its simplicity. Leveraged patents do not re-
181Tandon, supra note 178, at 471.
" Id. at 484.
"3 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293, 1299 (1996) (identi-
fying problems of a compulsory licensing scheme including wasted lobbying costs,
changed conditions, and the potential for legislative "lock-in" rendering the royalty
schedule inflexible over time).
'
84Tandon, supra note 178, at 484.
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quire any complicated determinations. Moreover, because the pat-
entee decides whether to leverage, leveraged patents are certain
not to harm the incentive to innovate.
Second, Tandon's compulsory licensing scheme presumably re-
quires the setting of license rates for every patent issued by the
patent office, or at least for any patent for which there is a poten-
tial licensee. This process is both expensive and wasteful. It re-
quires either a judicial or an administrative determination of a
"price" for an enormous number of inventions, many of which turn
out to be of negligible social value. Leveraged patents, however,
are self-effecting. Not only does our scheme not require an expen-
sive price setting mechanism, but it also adopts an ex post ap-
proach to the problem, ensuring that only patents of sufficient so-
cial value will continue to enjoy legal protection.
Finally, and most obviously, Tandon's proposal requires a legis-
lative overhaul of the patent system. Currently, patents are not
subject to compulsory licenses. Given the recent trend to expand
and solidify intellectual property protection, the introduction of
comprehensive compulsory licensing is unlikely. Leveraged pat-
ents, by contrast, are an existing phenomenon.
2. Probabilistic Enforcement
A different mechanism for reducing the deadweight loss of pat-
ents has been proposed by Ayres and Klemperer. Eschewing the
drawbacks of compulsory licensing, their proposal rests on the dual
principles of uncertainty and delay. Specifically, they propose that
patentees be allowed to bring lawsuits against infringers only at the
end of the patent term, which would limit the remedy to monetary
damages. Even then, however, patentees would not be able to
collect the full damage they suffered, but rather a fraction of that
amount to be determined probabilistically. As Ayres and Klem-
perer explain, under their proposed regime,
the patentee of a true innovation-that is, an innovation deserv-
ing immediate and certain enforcement under current law-
would have to wait until the day the patent expired to learn if a
court would award damages for any past infringement; and the
"' Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 179, at 988,994.
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court would make this determination simply by flipping a weighted
coin with, say, only an 80% chance of enforcement.'
The aim of the partial enforcement is to encourage a certain
level of patent infringement. The infringing production would "ex-
pand industry output and decrease the market price,"'" and thus
reduce the deadweight loss generated by patents. To compensate
patentees for the drop in their returns, Ayres and Klemperer pro-
pose that patent duration be extended. They noted that the neces-
sary extension may be approximated by "[m]ultiplying the duration
by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement."' m For exam-
ple, if the probability of enforcement is 50%, the duration should
be increased by 200%.'89
Leveraged patents are superior to probabilistic enforcement on
several grounds. First, the delay and uncertainty Ayres and Klem-
perer seek to introduce might not only increase the likelihood that
valid patents will not be enforced, but also that invalid patents will
be. Indeed, the passage of time might reinforce the tendency of the
courts to uphold questionable patents,19' especially those that
achieved commercial success.191 Leveraged patents do not give rise
to this risk. Second, Ayres and Klemperer seek to increase produc-
tion of patented inventions by encouraging infringements.'9 The
downside of this mechanism is the notoriously high cost of patent
litigation.' 93 As Ayres and Klemperer admit, "[s]ome forms of
uncertainty and delay would undoubtedly lead to litigation costs
" Id. at 995.
'g'Id. at 993.
'8 Id. at 1009.
18 Id.
9'Id. at 1020 (noting that the Federal Circuit's "protection of patent qua property
becomes an end in itself, trumping all other conceptions of the good"). This problem
is compounded by the tendency of patent examiners to issue poor quality patents be-
cause of the increase in the volume of patent applications. See Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Con-
cepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577 (1999).
.See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perpectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 803, 816 (1988) ("[T]oday, nonintrinsic
evidence... referred to as the 'secondary' or 'objective' considerations.... occupies
an increasingly important place in nonobviousness determinations."). The most im-
portant secondary consideration is the commercial success of the invention.
2 Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 179, at 993.
"3 Anyone who doubts the importance of litigation costs in patent enforcement
need only look at this advice to patentees:
Prospective counsel will generally request anywhere from one-third to one-half
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certainty and delay would undoubtedly lead to litigation costs that
swamp the benefits of limited interim infringement .... "" 4Lever-
aged patents, by contrast, do not exacerbate litigation costs; they
do not even necessitate judicial intervention. Third, Ayres and
Klemperer rely on the average depreciation rates of patents from
various industries in setting enforcement rates.'9 5 This means that
some individual inventors would be undercompensated by the ju-
dicial determination, while others would be overcompensated.
Thus, Ayres and Klemperer manage to preserve the incentive to
innovate only on average, but not in each individual case. Our pro-
posal avoids this problem.
Finally, as is the case with Tandon's proposal, Ayres and Klem-
perer's proposal requires a comprehensive reform of the patent
system. To work effectively, it would require sweeping changes not
only in patent remedies, but also in litigation processes. Such
changes are highly unlikely. In contrast, leveraged patents are pos-
sible under the existing patent system, and firms have been taking
advantage of this possibility.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to fill a curious gap between in-
tellectual property theory and practice. The theory consistently
treats patents, copyrights, and trademarks as separate forms of pro-
tection, each independent of the others. By contrast, real world
of the total recovery. Unless this number is a multiple of the typical $1.5 million
litigation cost, in all likelihood he will not be interested. Simple arithmetic gives
us $15 million in damages as a minimum threshold to arouse the curiosity of the
potential counsel to continue to listen to the rest of your story. Practically speak-
ing, however, most counsel will not consider a case where potential damages are
less than $100 million. This amount of damages corresponds roughly to a half
billion dollars in annual infringing revenues ....
Deciding When And How To Enforce Your Patent, Mondaq Int'l Briefing, Jan. 12,
2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 8986875.
The situation may be even worse in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Rosemary Ben-
nett & Jean Eaglesham, Legislation to Mandate Greater Damages for Patent Breaches,
Fm. Times (London), Nov. 1, 2001, at 4. ("The UK is known to offer a difficult com-
bination of high costs and relatively low damages for people trying to defend patent
rights .... James Dyson, for example, is estimated to have spent more than [$3 mil-
lion] on patent litigation against Hoover over his Dyson vacuum cleaners.").
" Ayres and Kemperer, supra note 179, at 1014. To avoid this problem, Ayres and
Kemperer call for a reform in the patent system.
'9 Id. at 1010-11.
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businesses have long combined different modalities to increase
their competitive advantage over rivals. While the discrete analysis
has shed light on each of the subfields of intellectual property, it
has obfuscated the important interconnections among them, and
obscured the efficiency effects therein. By adopting a unified per-
spective, we have been able to show that certain combinations of
intellectual property protection give rise to important synergies,
and thereby enhance economic efficiency. Specifically, we have
demonstrated that the availability of subsequent trademark protec-
tion mitigates the proclivity of both patentees and trade secret
holders to price monopolistically.
Our analysis of the synergistic effects among various modes of
intellectual property has yielded important descriptive, normative,
and methodological implications. Descriptively, we have shown
that the deadweight loss of patent and trade secrecy protection is
lower than is commonly believed, and that the incentives to inno-
vate are higher. Normatively, we have called for a reversal of the
prevailing judicial hostility to leveraged patents and explained how
the law can take advantage of leveraged patents to improve the
tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiencies in innovation pol-
icy. Most importantly perhaps, methodologically, we have demon-
strated the need for an integrated analysis of intellectual property.
When synergies exist, exclusive focus on the parts often leads to
a distorted perception of the whole. While there are many obvious
differences between the study of intellectual property and an ele-
phant parable, they do share a common moral: Both point to the
importance of an integrated analysis.
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APPENDIX: A DYNAMIC PRICING MODEL
Our simple model had only a single period in which the patent is
in effect, followed by a single period when the product was pro-
tected only by its trademark and brand loyalty. Our conclusions,
however, are largely insensitive to this assumption. A more com-
plex model-in which patent protection lasts for twenty years and
is followed by trademark protection extending into the indefinite
future--does not alter the results, as long as consumers have a
short time horizon or do not anticipate the future. '9 Moreover, the
dynamic model yields a result that is supported by the case studies
we discussed earlier: Patentees seeking to build brand loyalty will
not increase output and cut prices uniformly over the patent pe-
riod. Instead, they will cut output more heavily as the patent nears
expiration.
Understanding the dynamics of brand loyalty and patent pricing
requires a brief discussion about how brand loyalty is generated
and maintained over time.' 9 While there are many plausible for-
mulations, we adopt a simple specification, in which the post-
patent switching cost is a one-shot amount that is fixed for all con-
sumers for all time; the number of consumers with switching costs
depends on the average number served by the patentee over the
twenty periods during which the patent is in effect. This formula-
'9 See discussion supra Section IV.B for an explanation of why our theory about
building brand loyalty by increasing output essentially vanishes when consumers are
infinitely-lived and forward-looking. There will, however, still be a small brand-loyalty
effect even in this case, but a common problem of brand loyalty stories of any kind is
that they are not truly compatible with "rational expectations" on the part of consum-
ers.
' Various alternatives seem behaviorally plausible, including:
1. The size of an individual customer's switching cost, S, is a positive function of
the number of purchases made by that customer during the patent period;
2. The duration of the customer's switching cost-defined as the number of pur-
chases of the rival product that the customer must make before switching costs
are eliminated-is a positive function of the number of purchases during the
patent period; or
3. Either the size or duration of post-patent brand loyalty (or both) depends on
both the number of previous purchases and their liming. For example, sup-
pose-as might be reasonable-that brand loyalty decays over time. A cus-
tomer whose only purchase was in Period 1 would then have a lower switching




tion implies that the patentee can allocate its output over the
twenty-year patent period in any way it wishes, but it is only the to-
tal output over the period as a whole that determines its loyal cus-
tomer base after the patent expires.' 98
As is traditional in these situations, we solve the model by work-
ing backwards. That is, we first describe what price the (former)
patentee can charge its stock of loyal customers once the patent
has expired, assuming that the number of loyal customers is fixed
and the patentee can only change the price it charges. We then use
this information on optimal pricing in the post-patent period to
solve for the optimal quantity of loyal customers created while the
patent is in effect. Simultaneously, we show how the patentee will
allocate its output over the twenty-year patent life in order to
achieve this optimal quantity.
Post-Expiration Dynamics
Since we are now dealing explicitly with time, some additional
notation is necessary. We denote by r the annual interest rate, and
by 8, the discount factor, which is simply 1/(1+r). P , denotes the
price charged by the (former) patentee in period t, and P, denotes
the competitive price.
If we allow for an infinitely-lived consumer and an indefinite
trademark duration; the patentee's customers face a whole series
of "consumption plans" once the patent expires in Period 21. The
first alternative is to buy from the competitor immediately, paying
price P, plus switching cost S, this period. Since the switching cost
is modeled as a one-time only payment, once a loyal consumer has
tried the generic product, she can continue to purchase it at its
quoted price, Pc, forever after. A second consumption plan is to
buy from the patentee at the price being charged this period, P, 21,
and switch to the competitor, at price Pc + S, next period, paying Pc
forever after. A third is to buy from the patentee for two periods
and then switch, and so on. Knowing this, the patentee must set
current and future prices so that its loyal customers are indifferent
between switching and remaining loyal in each period, including
In other words, producing fifty units each year for twenty years yields the same
number of loyal customers as producing twenty-five units for the first ten years and
seventy-five units for the second ten years of the patent's life.
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the current one. In other words, the customer must expect to pay
the same amount in present value whether she switches today, to-
morrow, or not at all.
Note, too, that the present value of P, each period from time t
until infinity is just Pr. 199 This amount has to be discounted even
further, however, to reflect the fact that the customer does not be-
gin paying P, immediately, but instead must first pay P, + S and
then wait at least one period before being able to buy without any
switching cost.2 All this means that the consumer faces a choice
among the following:
Switch Immediately: (P, + S) + 8Pr, vs
Switch Next Period: P,,2, + 8(P + S) + 62Pr, vs
Switch in 2 Periods: PP, , + P p + +S) + 3Pr, and so on.
The former patentee will choose the maximum possible P, at
each point in time-the value that keeps the consumer just indif-
ferent between buying from it and switching to the competitor.
Hence, setting the first equation equal to the second and solving,
we have:
P, 21- (1- W) + 8Pc.2'
Given Pp21, we can then solve for the patentee's price in the sec-
ond period, Pp,2, by setting the second equation equal to the third.Again, the result is that P1.,, = (1-8)S+bP, =P .,. In short, the
patentee's price does not change over time. This price is just suffi-
cient to make the patentee's prior customers indifferent between
switching and remaining loyal in each period-the present dis-
"' How much would one have to put into a bank account to yield P, each year for-
ever? A deposit of P. yields PCxr per year in interest when the interest rate is r.
Hence, a deposit of PIr will pay P, in interest, which can be removed each year in
perpetuity without touching the principal.
" To solve for the time path of the patentee's post-expiration price, we assume that
there is a fixed stock of infinitely-lived "experienced" customers, each of whom has a
constant switching cost, S. Hence, the demand curve is no longer relevant and the
problem is one of choosing price, rather than quantity. We solve for the optimal stock
of consumers below.
" Technically, P = (1 - 8)S + PJ1 - 6 + (8 - 8')/r], which is approximately (1 - 6)S + 6P,
for small values of the interest rate r.
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counted value of the consumption plan is the same whether the
customer switches in Period 1, 2, 3, and so on, or not at all.
Note that the analysis so far has assumed that the patentee's
consumers have perfect foresight, at least once the patent has
lapsed. That is, they compare today's switching cost with the bene-
fit of being able to buy from the lower-priced competitor for the
rest of time. This naturally limits the patentee's ability to markup
her product over that of her rivals-the limit is not the switching
cost per se, but rather the present discounted value of the savings
from switching to the cheaper generic product. Given that the con-
sumer's switching cost only has to be paid once, that cost will obvi-
ously be less important the greater the number of additional pur-
chases the consumer plans to make, since the same switching cost is
amortized over a larger number of future purchases.2
What this means, in short, is that the switching cost story breaks
down almost completely if consumers have infinitely long time ho-
rizons. This in turn implies that patentees will not have any reason
to cultivate brand loyalty while the patent is in effect, since the
post-expiration return from doing so is only a tiny fraction of the
switching cost instead of the full switching cost.
Instead of assuming that consumers compare the current switch-
ing cost with the present discounted value of their future savings
from switching, however, we might plausibly make the opposite as-
sumption: that consumers are myopic.20' In this case, the patentee's
maximum post-expiration price would rise to S + P, reflecting the
full value of the switching cost. In sum, brand loyalty is only signifi-
cant in an infinite-horizon model if we assume that consumers are
not forward-looking.
Pre-Expiration Dynamics
Knowing that the post-expiration price will be (1 - 6)S + 8P, in
each period, the patentee will be in position to plot her optimal
quantity during the patent period. There are, however, two addi-
2 For an interest rate of 5%, this means that the patentee can charge no more than
approximately 0.05S + .95P. In other words, the switching cost loses 95% of its "fric-
tional" value when consumers are infinitely-lived and forward-looking.
mThis is a standard assumption in the switching cost literature. See, e.g., Gabsze-
wicz et al., supra note 71, at 399 (assuming that consumers do not take future switch-
ing costs into account when making decisions about present consumption plans).
1526 [Vol. 88:1455
Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property
tional complications. First, the future revenue stream of (1 - S)S + 8P,
each period from the expiration of the patent onwards must be dis-
counted to its present value as of Period 21. This involves dividing
by the interest rate, r, to capture the infinite nature of the revenue
stream.2
Second, an increase in Period-t output will have a different effect
on the present value of future profits depending on when it occurs.
Let Q = (1/20)E l Q, be the
average output over the twenty-year patent life. An increase of one
unit in any period will raise Q by 1/20 of a unit, but its discounted
effect on post-expiration profits depends on when during the
twenty years the increase occurs. Starting from the monopoly op-
timum, a one-unit increase in Period-20 output lowers profits in
Period 20, but raises profits the next period, after the patent lapses
by adding to 1/20 of a unit to the stock of loyal customers. By con-
trast, an increase in Period-1 output lowers profits immediately,
but does not raise profits until the patent expires twenty years
hence. Thus, we must discount future profits caused by a Period-t
increase in output by 621" to bring this future revenue stream to its
Period-t value (and then further discount to bring this stream to its
Period-0 value).
Hence, the patentee's full problem is:
Max 17X (a-bQ,)Q,8' +
Qt t=1 2
which is solved by setting
r 82 -'(8 P + (1-5) S)
Q aS -2bQ,8' + 2 = 0.
a i t 20r
This implies that the optimal quantity at time t, Q:, solves
' See supra note 199.
2002] 1527
1528 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1455
a 20r
2b 2b5
where a and b are the intercept and slope parameters from the de-
mand curve, and the other parameters are defined above.
Note that the first term in the expression for Q, is just the single-
period monopoly output, a/2b, which is not time dependent. The
second term is strictly positive and an increasing function of time,
from which we easily conclude that:
1. The trademark-leveraged patentee will always produce more
than the "pure" patentee in every period; and
2. Optimal output rises over time during the patent period.
These results are entirely consistent with our two-period model.
The chief difference is that if we assume consumers are forward-
looking in the sense described above, the patentee can only charge
8P: + (1 - 6)S, rather than (P, + S), and the leverage effect is corre-
spondingly diminished.
As the figure in the text-which is drawn assuming that consum-
ers are not forward-looking-illustrates, optimal output in the first
year of the patent's life is only infinitesimally greater than the sin-
gle-period monopoly level. As expiration approaches, however,
output rises to more than 30% above the single-period monopoly
level. Our story is thus at least roughly consistent with the dynam-
ics of the case studies, in which patentees seem to reserve the bulk
of their price cutting and attempts to build market share for the
patent's twilight years.
